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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview: The Problem
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[tihe
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ." In the past year, the
United States Supreme Court considered a case, the result of which has significantly
affected this right. Although the holding of the case severely limited the rights of
individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, it balanced on
questionable justifications.
In Ohio v. Robinette,2 the Court reaffirmed its prior rules regarding consent to
search and its test to determine whether a person has been seized under the Fourth
Amendment. Despite the significant impact that the Court's reaffirmation will have
on future consent to search and consensual interrogation situations, the Court failed
to justify why the reaffirmation of its case law would be appropriate under the facts
before it. The Court's reliance on its holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte4 as a
basis for deciding Robinette was both erroneous and ill-founded. As this Comment
will show, the Supreme Court transformed a garden-variety seizure issue into an
issue regarding consent to search. The seizure issue was addressed by both the Ohio
Court of Appeals5 and the Ohio Supreme Court,6 but was summarily side-stepped
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, this Comment argues that even if Robinette
could have been treated as a consent to search case, the Schneckloth "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining voluntariness of consent' is an imprudent rule
for consent to search issues arising under facts similar to those in Robinette. Thus,
Schneckloth should have been re-examined before the Court summarily applied it
to the facts of Robinette.
Ultimately, this Comment utilizes this recent Supreme Court opinion to demon-
strate how poorly conceived rules with patently false justifications can significantly,
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The text in full reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Id.
2. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
3. Id. at 40; see infra Part II.B.2 (noting the relevant principles under consent to search law).
4. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
5. See State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1994) (stating the
issue as whether a person in Robinette's shoes would have felt free to leave, or, in other words, whether Robinette
was seized).
6. See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695. 697 (Ohio 1995) (stating that "[w]e find that the search was
invalid since it was the product of an unlawful seizure") (emphasis added).
7. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
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yet unjustifiably, open the door to police abuses of Fourth Amendment protections.
This Comment suggests rules that can be theoretically and pragmatically justified
-rules that will balance the justifiable needs of law enforcement against the right
of the people to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions.
B. Principle of Particular Justification
As a preliminary matter, this Comment presumes that probable cause 8 and a
sufficiently particular warrant are both required for a search to be valid under the
Fourth Amendment. 9 There are, however, well-recognized exceptions to these
fundamental requirements. 0 Each exception is tied in reasoning and scope to the
justification that necessitates its existence."1 Thus, when the Court decides to apply
an exception to a particular set of facts, the justifications for having the exception
must still exist in light of the new facts, otherwise the expansion of the exception
is unwarranted. This approach to judicial decision-making is what this Comment
refers to as the "principle of particular justification."
2
Throughout its discussion, this Comment considers the justifications given for
deviations from the probable cause and warrant requirements under the facts of
8. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,162(1925) (stating that probable cause to search exists when
the police know of facts and circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, which would lead a
person of reasonable caution to believe that a search of the suspected area will result in the finding of criminal
evidence).
9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that a search conducted without a warrant
issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable "subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions").
10. Generally, warrant exceptions such as the "automobile exception," "search incident to a lawful arrest,"
and a general exigency createjustifications for the police to search or seize without a warrant. See Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 153-56 (recognizing that the "automobile exception" allows warrantless searches of automobiles based on
probable cause); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 762-63 (1969) (holding that, pursuant to a lawful
arrest, police can search the person of the arrestee and the area "within his immediate control without probable
cause to search or a warrant). In the case of consent searches, a valid consent defeats both the warrant and probable
cause requirements. See generally Sclmeckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.49 (determining that "voluntariness" is the proper
test for ascertaining whether consent to search was properly granted); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94
(1946) (recognizing a consent to search exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624,628-29 (1946) (holding that a person contracted with a government agency, where the contract
contained a clause allowing the federal government to audit his books, had validly waived his Fourth Amendment
right to privacy, and thus had consented to the search).
11. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (providing that the police, with probable cause to
believe there is contraband in a vehicle, can search anywhere in the vehicle that the contraband could be kept,
including any containers which are large enough to hold the suspected contraband); see also Schmerber v,
California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (allowing police to, without a warrant, extract blood from a detainee who is
suspected of driving under the influence. This intrusion is justified because of the need of the police to determine
quickly the detainee' blood alcohol level and because of the reasonableness of the means used to extract the blood).
See generally JosHiUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § § 12.01-17.06 (2d ed. 1997) (describing
various warrant exceptions and their justifications and scope).
12. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (stating that "evidence may not be introduced if it was
discovered by means of seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation") (citations omitted).
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Robinette and its predecessors. If the justifications from Schneckloth still exist
under the facts of Robinette, then assuming that Schneckloth was well-conceived,
the extension of the Schneckloth rule is permissible. This Comment demonstrates,
however, that the extension of Schneckloth's holding was unjustified, because
Schneckloth created a poorly conceived rule, and the justifications that the Court
relied upon in Schneckloth did not exist under the facts of Robinette.3 Thus, the
principle of particular justification would not recognize the consent to search
exception to the warrant (and probable cause) requirement under 'the facts of
Robinette.
II. OHIO V. ROR1NETTE
A. Factual Background
In Robinette, Robert D. Robinette was clocked driving his vehicle sixty-nine
miles per hour in a forty-five mile per hour construction zone. 4 Officer Roger
Newsome, of the Montgomery County Sheriff's office, stopped Robinette for
speeding.'5 Newsome requested Robinette to hand him his driver's license, then he
proceeded to run a computer check which indicated Robinette had no previous
violations.' 6 Officer Newsome then requested Robinette to step out of his vehicle,
turned on his mounted video camera, gave a verbal warning to Robinette, and
returned Robinette's license. t7 Immediately, Newsome began a "conversation" with
Robinette that was of key significance to the outcome of the case.'
8
Just as Robinette was about to leave, Newsome said, "One question before you
get gone [sic]: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons
of any kind, drugs, anything like that?"' 9 Robinette said no.20 Subsequently,
13. See infra Part IV.A.I (discussing the weaknesses of the Scluteckloth justifications and analyzing their
application in light of the facts of Robinette).




18. Respondent's Brief at 27, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (No. 95-891).
19. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 35-36. The Appendix to Respondent's Brief delineates the substance of the
videotaped conversation between Officer Newsome and Robinette.
Dispatch: (Inaudible.)
Officer Newsome: What do you do for a living?
Mr. Robinette: I work for International Paper.
Officer Newsome: Okay.
Since you live in Montgomery County, and you're almost at the end of your trip, I'm going to cut
you some slack. Okay?
Mr. Robinette: I didn't see the sign was dropped down.
Officer Newsome: If you have been watching the news you know we've been having a lot of problems
with accidents up here, one right after another. We just want to get everyone to slow down. We have
been writing a lot of tickets, though.
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Newsome asked, "Would you mind if I search your car?' 2' Robinette said that he
did not mind if the officer searched the vehicle;22 the resulting search of the vehicle
revealed marijuana and a methamphetamine pill.'
Newsome arrested Robinette, and the district attorney charged Robinette with
knowing possession of a controlled substance.24 At a pretrial hearing, Robinette
unsuccessfully moved to suppress this evidence.25 Robinette pleaded no contest, and
the trial court found him guilty on all counts.26 The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court's decision not to suppress the contraband evidence on the basis that
the consent to search was invalid because it was obtained as a result of an unlawful
seizure.27 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court's decision,
adopting a bright line rule requiring officers, who have validly stopped a driver, to
inform the driver that he or she is free to go prior to requesting consent to search.28
The court's opinion required law enforcement officers to provide this instruction
whenever the purpose of the initial detention no longer exists, yet the
"conversation" continues, and the consent to search is subsequently requested. 9
In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision finding that the United States Constitution does
not require the instruction mandated by the Ohio Supreme Court.3" Reaffirming the
"totality of the circumstances" test for determining Whether a person has been
One question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any
weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?
Nothing like that? Okay..
Is all the luggage in there both yours and his? All of it? Okay. Would you mind if I search your
car? Make sure there's nothing in there? Wouldn't have any problem with it? Why don't step up here
on the passenger side, right up here. Come on over here. Come out, please. Okay.
If you would both of you stand about ten feet in front of your car there and face the other way.
Officer Newsome: Is that all the marijuana you got?
Mr. Robinette: Console.
Officer Newsome: Okay.
Appendix, Respondent's Brief at 27, Robinette (No. 95-891).
20. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36.
21. Respondent's Brief at 2a, Robinette (No. 95-891).





27. Id.; State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1994).
28. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995). The court adopted this rule in syllabus two of its
opinion. Id. at 696. The Ohio Supreme Court speaks as a court through its syllabi only. See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425
U.S. 257, 259-60 (1976) (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court utilizes its syllabi to announce its rules of criminal
and evidentiary law); Cassidy v. Glossip, 231 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ohio 1967) (reiterating the rule that the syllabi of the
Ohio Supreme Court state the law of the case); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,566-
67 n.3 (1977) (stating that the United States Supreme Court may look to the opinion of an Ohio Supreme Court
decision to interpret the meaning of a particular syllabus, if the syllabus speaks only in general terms of state and
federal constitutional law).
29. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
30. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 40.
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seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court refused to adopt a bright line rule
in an area where it has "consistently eschewed bright-line rules."'" The Court
remanded the case to the Ohio Supreme Court to either settle the case upon ade-
quate state grounds, or to review the case using the totality of the circumstances
test.32
On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered its bright line rule, but for
reasons other than those articulated by the United States Supreme Court.33 The court
first articulated its intent to harmonize the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth
Amendment. 34 It found no substantial reason to deviate from the federal standard
for determining validity of consent.35 The court then reexamined the facts of
Robinette to determine whether Robinette was justifiably seized at various points
throughout his encounter with Newsome.36
The court found that Officer Newsome was justified in stopping Robinette for
speeding 37 and for pulling Robinette out of the vehicle.3 Newsome was even
justified in further detaining Robinette to ask him the questions regarding the
contraband, 39 but the request for consent to search was unjustified.40 As such,
Newsome obtained the consent as a result of an unlawful seizure.4' The court
continued by considering whether Robinette's consent was valid independent of the
unlawful seizure,42 but ultimately concluded that the state failed to meet its burden
of showing valid consent to search. More specifically, it found that all the state
managed to show was that Robinette "merely submitted" to "a claim of lawful
authority.' 43 Thus, the consent was invalid as a product of the unlawful seizure.
B. Applicable Legal Principles
To aid the reader in understanding the various legal issues addressed at each
court level, this Comment now briefly discusses the applicable legal principles
regarding seizures of persons and consent to search. More extensive treatment of
these issues is discussed where relevant.
31. Id. at 39-40.
32. Id.
33. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997).
34. Id. at 767.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 767-68.
37. Id. at 767.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 768.
40. ld.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 769-70.
43. Id. at 771.
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1. Basis for Seizures of Persons
To reiterate, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, in part, is to protect the
rights of citizens to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures.44 To
determine if aparticular act constitutes an unreasonable seizure, two questions must
be answered: (1) Did the officer's conduct in question constitute a seizure?; and (2)
If it was a seizure, was that seizure "reasonable" in light of caselaw?
45
Terry v. Ohio46 was a seminal case, which among other things, announced a
new definition for seizures of persons: "It must be recognized that whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person."47 Later, in United States v. Mendenhall,48 the Court refined the
Terry definition of "seizure of a person" to give it an objective element: "[A] person
has been 'seized' ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.,
49
Thus, the "seizure" test requires a court to consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the event alleged to have resulted in a seizure."
In Florida v. Bostick,5 ' the Court slightly altered the Mendenhall standard to
address the situation where a person is voluntarily in a confined space, and not there
as a result of police conduct.52 In that situation, the test becomes "whether a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter.'' 53 Finally, in California v. Hodari D.,-4 the Supreme Court
announced a new rule regarding seizures resulting from police pursuits or other
"show of authority" seizures. The Court held that a person is seized by a show of
authority if the officer applies physical force, like physical touching, or if the sub-
ject yields or otherwise submits to the officer 5 The Court expressly rejected the
44. See supra note I (citing the text of the Fourth Amendment).
45. This Comment will only address the first question because the issues of the extent of a seizure and its
"reasonableness" were not necessary to the resolution of the Robinette.
46. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. The Court clarified this definition by stating "[o]nly when [an] officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred." Id. at 19 n.16.
48. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
49. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. This rule was announced in a plurality portion of the opinion, but was later
adopted by a majority of the Court in Florida it Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
50. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
51. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
52. See id. at 435-36 (stating that "when (a] person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree
to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect
of the encounter").
53. Id. at 436. The Court further insisted that this rule follows logically from earlier cases. Id. at 436-37.
54. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
55. Id. at 626. This rule was first stated in Michigan it Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,577 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), where Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that "[ilt is at least plausible to say that
whether.., the officers' conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief that [the police] intend to apprehend
him, such conduct does not implicate the Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect." Id.
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argument that Mendenhall stated the test to sufficiently establish when a person has
been seized pursuant to a "show of authority" seizure.56 The way the issue was
framed, however, may have expanded the scope of Hodari D. to cover all show of
authority seizures, not simply police pursuit seizures.57
Because the standard for determining whether a person has been seized under
the Fourth Amendment is an objective one, and given the fact that this issue
requires analysis based upon all the circumstances, this Comment will synthesize
some of the major cases in this area in order to develop a list of circumstances that
may lead a court to find that a person has been seized.58
The facts and holding in Mendenhall indicate that a person is not seized when
the police simply walk up and start a conversation with him or her. 9 Mendenhall
also shows that the personal characteristics of the detainee are relevant in deter-
mining whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.6 A key fact in
Mendenhall that led the Court to find the absence of a seizure was that the police
officers returned the defendant's license and ticket prior to requesting her to
accompany them to the police station in the airport.61 Further, the officers
approached her instead of summoning her, they were not wearing uniforms, and
they did not display their weapons. 62 These facts influenced the Court to hold that
(emphasis added).
56. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 628 (stating that "Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a 'show
of authority' is an objective one .... We did not address ... the question whether, if the Mendenhall test was
met-if the message that [the subject] was not free to leave had been conveyed-a Fourth Amendment seizure
would have occurred."); see also id. (stating that the Mendenhall test only established a necessary ground, and not
a necessarily sufficient ground, for finding a seizure of a person).
57. See id. at 626 ("The narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with
respect to application of physical force, a seizure occurs even though the subject does not yield. We hold that it does
not.").
58. In Robinette, the Ohio Supreme Court, in its first consideration of the case, cited only the Mendenhall
test as the proper "seizure of persons" test. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 698. Because of the treatment of the seizure
issue at the state level, this Comment will only focus on that test, although it recognizes that, because of Hodari
D., the result of the Mendenhall test may not be determinative of the seizure question in the case of a show of
authority seizure. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628 (stating that, for show of authority seizures, the Mendenhall
seizure test is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to a finding a seizure; in addition, a court must find either
physical touching by the police or submission by the suspect).
59. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (stating that the "respondent was not seized simply by reason of the
fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to
her a few questions"); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (declaring that "[w]hat is apparent from
[the cases] is that police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment [seizure]").
60. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (noting that, for purposes of determining whether consent to search
was voluntary, the fact that the defendant was 22 years old and had not graduated from high school were relevant
in the totality of the circumstances inquiry). Given that the test for seizure is also a totality of the circumstances test,
by analogy, the characteristics of the subject are equally relevant for seizure purposes.
61. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,501-02 (1983) (noting that the retention of the defendant's license
and plane ticket, without any further indication that he was free to leave, are significant factors which lead to a
finding of a seizure). For other significant factors, see 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(a) (3d ed. 1996).
62. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 555.
1998 / Ohio v. Robinette
a reasonable person would have felt free to leave; thus, there was no seizure and no
implication of the Fourth Amendment. 63
In a similar case, Florida v. Royer,64 two police officers stopped the defendant
because he fit a "drug-courier profile.' 65 In contrast with Mendenhall, however, the
officers in Royer retained the defendant's plane ticket and identification. 6 The
Court held that the defendant was seized within the meaning of the Mendenhall test
because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under those
circumstances. 67
There are other factors relevant in determining whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave. "The consideration most frequently cited in the cases
finding consent [and no seizure] is that the police specifically advised the suspect
that he was not under arrest or that he was free to leave if he wished., 68 But
informing a suspect that he is free to leave is not dispositive if additional police
conduct of a coercive nature nullifies the advice.69 A showing that the police
physically restrained the defendant almost certainly will result in a finding of a
seizure, whereas no physical restraint indicates no seizure." To reiterate, the
characteristics of the defendant are relevant in determining whether or not a
reasonable person would have felt free to leave.7t But this standard does assume a
reasonable innocent person.72
63. The Court also noted that the suspect voluntarily consented because the police informed her twice of
her right of refuse to consent. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558.
64. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
65. See id. at 493 n.2 (describing the "drug courier" profile as "an abstract of characteristics found to be
typical of persons transporting illegal drugs").
66. See Mendenhall,446 U.S. at 548 (noting that the officer handed Mendenhall her ticket and license back);
see also infra note 67 (stating that the officers retained Royer's ticket and license when they asked him to go to the
police office).
67. The Court reasoned that
[a]sking for and examining Royer's ticket and his driver's license were no doubt permissible in
themselves, but when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer that he was
suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the police room, while
retaining his ticket and driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was free to depart,
Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-02.
68. 3 LAFAvE, supra note 61, § 5.1(a) (citations omitted).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (noting the defendant's personal characteristics were not irrelevant in
the consent to search inquiry). The Court also stated that "circumstances that might indicate a seizure.., would
be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of
the ... citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might
be compelled." Id. at 554 (citations omitted).
72. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 61, § 5.1(a) (citations omitted).
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2. Consent to Search
The general rule for warrantless searches is that such acts are per se unrea-
sonable unless some exception exists that excuses the need for a warrant.73 Consent
is one such exception.74 Consent not only excuses the lack of a search warrant, but
italso excuses the requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion." The
issues that often arise in consent search cases are whether the person validly
consented, and assuming valid consent, what was the scope of the consent.76
The leading case concerning the validity of consent to search is Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.17 In Schneckloth, the Court utilized its due process line of confession
cases to forge a rule for determining whether consent was voluntarily given.78 The
test mandates an inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the
consent to determine whether the person voluntarily gave consent to search.79 The
Court refused to adopt a waiver test for consent searches, relying instead upon the
fact specific, totality of the circumstances voluntariness test.80 The Court also
declined to adopt a bright line rule which would make the detainee's knowledge of
the right to refuse consent a condition precedent to finding effective consent.8
In Bumper v. North Carolina,82 a case preceding Schneckloth, the Court estab-
lished that consent will not be found when it was obtained as a result of a police
officer's claim of lawful authority.83 In Bumper, four policemen went to the home
of the defendant's grandmother and falsely announced to the grandmother that they
had a warrant to search her home. 4 The grandmother acquiesced, and the officers
searched her home;85 this led to the discovery of incriminating evidence against the
defendant.
86
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
74. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,593-94 (1946) (recognizing that consent to search can validate
an otherwise invalid warrantless search).
75. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218.219 (1973) (noting that consent is an exception to both
a warrant and probable cause).
76. This latter question regarding the scope of the consent given will be discussed later. See infra Part
IV.A. l.b.ii (explaining the test for determining the scope of a consent search).
77. 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the facts and reasoning of Schneckloth).
78. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223-27 (analyzing the due process confession cases).
79. Id. at 248-49.
80. See generally id. at 235-46 (discussing the inapplicability of the waiver standard to Fourth Amendment
consent to search jurisprudence).
81. Id. at226-27.
82. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
83. Id. at 550 ("When a[n] ... officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in
effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion .... Where there
is coercion there cannot be consent.").
84. Id. at 546.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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In deciding the case, the Court stated that prosecutors who seek to rely on
consent to validate an otherwise invalid search have "the burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. '7 The Court further stated that
this burden cannot be met by a mere showing by the state of a submission to a claim
of lawful authority.8
A synthesis of Schneckloth and Bumper establishes that consent, if the product
of coercion, is not recognized as valid under the Fourth Amendment. Voluntariness
is the test for valid consent to search, and determining whether consent was given
voluntarily requires the application of a totality of the circumstances test. Finally,
the prosecutor carries the burden of showing that consent was voluntarily given, and
that it was not the product of coercion. 9
IlI. OHIO V. ROBINETTE: THE DECISIONS9°
Given the factual background behind the case, and the applicable legal
principles, this Comment now briefly examines the analysis of the Ohio Court of
Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court, followed by a discussion of the United States
Supreme Court's review of the decision. The Comment will then consider the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision of Robinette after it was remanded by the United States
Supreme Court.
A. Ohio Court of Appeals: Robinette I
In Robinette I, the Ohio Court of Appeals focused on the issue of whether a
reasonable person in Robinette's position would have believed that the investigatory
stop had been concluded and that he was free to go, despite the continued ques-
tioning from Officer Newsome.9' Robinette argued that the purpose of the initial
stop no longer existed when Newsome engaged him in the investigatory ques-
tioning, and thus the consent to search was obtained unlawfully due to an invalid
seizure.92 In contrast, the State opined that Robinette was free to go, and thus he was
not seized when he consented to the search.93 The court held that a reasonable
87. Id. at 548 (citations omitted)
88. Id. at 548-49.
89. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
90. For purposes of clarity, this Comment will hereinafter refer to the Ohio Court of Appeals decision of
Robinette, State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1994) as Robinette I. The first
Ohio Supreme Court review of Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), will be referred to as Robinette I. The
United States Supreme Court decision in Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), will be called Robinette IiI, and the remand
decision by the Ohio Supreme Court, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997), will be referred to as Robinette IV
91. Robinette , 1994 WL 147806, at *2.
92. Id. at*1.
93. Id.
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person in Robinette's shoes would not believe that the investigatory stop had ended
or that he was free to leave.94
In deciding this case, the Ohio Court of Appeals focused on State v.
Retherford,95 a case with "an identical fact pattern," which also involved Officer
Newsome. "In that case, [the court] held that once a police officer has issued a
traffic violation or warning for a speeding violation, it is unreasonable to detain the
motorist further for the purpose of obtaining consent to search.. ,,96 Under this
type of situation,97 the court believed that a reasonable person would not feel free
to go, thus making the unjustified seizure unlawful.98
The opinion makes it evident that the Court of Appeals dealt only with the issue
of the lawfulness of the continued seizure of Robinette. The issue regarding consent
to search was not a question of whether the consent to search was voluntary, but
rather was a question of whether the consent to search was invalid as a "fruit" of an
unlawful seizure.99
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Wolff argued that, based on the fact that Robinette
had a bachelor of science degree, he was sufficiently educated to know that he was
free to go.t °° He further opined that because Robinette testified that he felt free to
leave at the time Newsome handed back his license, Robinette could not have been
seized.' O' The dissent did not focus on the testimony by Robinette that the questions
94. Id. at *2.
95. 639 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
96. Robizette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *2.
97. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498. As stated before, Retherford involved "identical" facts as Robinette.
Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *2. Just as in Robinette, Officer Newsome stopped Retherford for speeding.
Retherford, 639 N.E.2d at 501. After giving Retherford a warning citation, Newsome used a "technique," which
he apparently used often in similar cases. Id. at 501. After issuing a citation, he would tell the person she was free
to go; then as the driver turned her back, Newsome would engage her in "one more question," which ultimately
became a request to search the person's vehicle. Id. In Retherford, Newsome engaged Retherford in one of these
"casual conversations," asking about her travel plans and destination. Id. He handed her the citation and told her
she was free to go. Id. Once Retherford turned her back, Newsome said, "Excuse me, can I ask you one thing before
you go?" Id. Retherford said "sure," and the resulting questions led to a request to search her vehicle, to which she
agreed. Id. Newsome later testified, in Retherford, that he had requested consent to search about 786 times in 1992
alone. Id. at 502. Note that in Robiette, Newsome never told Robinette that he was free to go, but otherwise he
utilized the same method as that which he used on Retherford. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
98. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d at 507.
We think that no reasonable person subjected to a traffic stop would feel free to walk away at any time
when she is questioned about and confronted with the suspicion of drug trafficking ....
Thus, we conclude that the initial seizure of Retherford was not converted into a mere consensual
encounter by her purported release because Deputy Newsome immediately focused a new investigation
on Retherford not reasonably related to the purpose of the initial stop.
Id. (citations omitted).
99. Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *2. See infra note 218 (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3(a) (2d ed. 1992)
(discussing this doctrine further).
100. Robizette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *3 (Wolff, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
909
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following the return of his license "shocked" him, and that he felt that he had to
answer the officer's questions.'°2
Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the issue was whether the con-
tinued questioning by Newsome constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
- or rather, whether a reasonable person in the shoes of Robinette would have felt free
to leave. 3 Neither discussed the voluntariness of Robinette's consent outside of the
discussion of whether it was invalid as a product of an unlawful seizure. Moreover,
the Ohio Court of Appeals impliedly found that an unlawful detention occurred
when Robinette was outside of the vehicle and after Newsome returned his
license.1°4
B. Ohio Supreme Court: Robinette II
1. Seizure Issue
The Ohio Supreme Court stated the issue as "whether the evidence used against
Robinette was obtained through a valid search."10 5 To answer this question, the
court focused on whether the purpose of the initial seizure had ended, and whether
Robinette was unlawfully seized when Newsome requested the consent to search. 106
Of particular import to the court was the fact that the sole purpose for the initial
seizure of Robinette was his speeding.0 7 "[Newsome] stopped Robinette for the
purpose of giving a warning. [He]-admitted that he never had any suspicions
concerning Robinette beyond giving him a warning for speeding. That was the sole
purpose for the stop."'08
Since Newsome was only going to give a warning, and he had already checked
Robinette's license, "every aspect of the speeding violation had been investigated
and resolved."'" Without any articulable facts, "Newsome extended his detention
of Robinette by ordering him out of the vehicle."" 0 Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court
found that an unjustifiable seizure occurred once Newsome commanded Robinette
102. Robinette !. 653 N.E.2d at 696.
103. Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806. at *2: see id. at *4 (Wolff. J.. dissenting) (arguing that the evidence
supported a finding that Robinette was not seized when he consented to the search).
104. Id. at *2. This point becomes relevant because the Ohio Supreme Court found that the detention occurred
when Robinette was asked to exit his vehicle. Robinette !!, 653 N.E.2d at 698. Thus, to that court, the seizure was
of a greater extent.
105. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806. at *Isee Robinette II. 653 N.E.2d at 697 (noting that Officer Newsome
had cause to stop Robinette for speeding, but he had no suspicion when he ordered Robinette to exit the vehicle). But
see Pennsylvania v. Mimms. 434 U.S. 106, III n.6 (1977) (holding that, pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, an officer
may order a driver out of her vehicle, as a matter of course, without violating the Fourth Amendment).
109. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697.
110. Id.
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to exit the vehicle.' Citing its previous decision of State v. Chatton,"H2 the court
found that the continued detention was unlawful because it was not based on any
articulable facts giving rise to probable cause to extend the scope of the initial
detention."' "Therefore the detention of Robinette ceased being legal when
Newsome asked [Robinette] to leave his vehicle.""
' 4
2. Consent to Search Issue
Because of the unlawful seizure, the court next considered whether Robinette's
consent was the product of the unlawful seizure." 5 To do this, the court examined
whether the consent to search was sufficiently removed from the taint caused by the
illegal seizure to make the consent independently valid." 6 Relying on factors
delineated in United States v. Richardson,"17 the Ohio Supreme Court found that
there was no lapse of time between the illegal detention and the request to search,
and there were no circumstances that might have either broken or weakened the
connection between the request to search and the illegal seizure."18 It further found
that the sole purpose of the continued detention was to unlawfully expand the scope
111. See id. at 698 ("Therefore the detention of Robinette ceased being legal when Newsome asked him to
leave his vehicle."). This fact is important because the seizure, as seen by the Court of Appeals, occurred when
Newsome asked the "one more thing" question, Robinette I, 1994 WL 147806, at *2, whereas the Ohio Supreme
Court saw the seizure as starting once Robinette was pulled from his vehicle. Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d at 698. If
the seizure began once Robinette left his vehicle, then the extent of the seizure was greater than what the Ohio Court
of Appeals found. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing how the two courts differed on the extent
of the seizure).
112. 463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240-41 (Ohio 1984) (holding that when a police officer's sole purpose for stopping
a driver was because the driver's vehicle lacked license plates, and when the officer approaches the vehicle and
discovers a valid temporary tag in the window, then, absent additional articulable suspicion to further detain the
driver, the officer can no longer lawfully detain the driver).
113. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697-98.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court utilized factors to determine whether Robinette's "consent" was an
"independent act of free will," id., but the factors it applied were similar to those for the "attenuation doctrine." See
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the underlying notion behind the
attenuation doctrine); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,341-42 (1939) (noting the complexities of applying
the attenuation doctrine). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 11, § 21.08[b][2] (discussing the attenuation doctrine,
and its relevant factors of temporal proximity, length of causal chain, act of free will, flagrancy of the violation, and
the nature of the derivative evidence). This Comment will use "independent act of free will" and "attenuation"
synonymously because the former was the language utilized by the Ohio Supreme Court.
117. 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991). In Richardson, police officers gained consent to search from the
defendant after they placed him in the back of a police car. Id. at 854. The police had no articulable suspicion that
crime was afoot. Id. The court found that the placing of defendant in the police car constituted an arrest, and
because it was suspicionless, it was unlawful. Id. at 858. In determining that the defendant's consent was invalid
as a fruit of the unlawful arrest, the court relied on several factors: 1) The length of time between the unlawful
seizure and the subsequent search; 2) whether there were intervening circumstances; and 3) "the purpose and
flagrancy of the misconduct." Id. at 858.
118. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
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of the original lawful seizure."1 9 Consequently, the taint was not sufficiently
removed to make Robinette's consent to search valid.' 20
3. Ohio Supreme Court's Bright Line Rule
After finding that the consent was not sufficiently removed from the taint of the
unlawful seizure, the court decided, in light of the difficulty of determining whether
a seizure occurred under these facts, to adopt a bright line rule that would delineate
the point "between the conclusion of a valid seizure and the beginning of a consen-
sual exchange."' 2' Noting that the "transition between detention and a consensual
exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has
occurred,"'22 and that the "undetectability of that transition may be used by police
officers to coerce citizens into answering questions that they need not answer, or to
allow a search of a vehicle that they are not legally obligated to allow,"'" the court
decided that an officer must tell a legally detained motorist that she is free to go
prior to engaging her in a "consensual conversation" once the stop has ended.
124
Otherwise, any consent to search obtained during the prolonged detention would be
deemed invalid as a fruit of the unlawful seizure, unless there were some
attenuating facts that would indicate the consent was valid independent of the
seizure.t25
The court emphasized that the leading seizure and consent to search cases
involved situations where the defendant was approached by the police for no valid
reason, and thus there was no valid initial seizure.1 26 In those situations, the police






124. See id. at 699 (stating that
we are convinced that the right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in one's
person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the
detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage
in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase
'At this time you legally are free to go' orby words of similar import.).
Id.
125. The court's holding does not mention this extension, but it was implied that such an analysis would be
used given appropriate facts because the court employed the analysis once it determined that Robinette was
unlawfully seized. Id. at 698. It is also doubtful that the Ohio Supreme Court would alter its law regarding the
"independent act" or attenuation exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine without stating so clearly in
its syllabi. For the factors which the Ohio Supreme Court uses to determine whether consent to search is valid
independent of an unlawful seizure, see supra note 117 (listing the Richardson factors).
126. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991) (noting that an officer approached the defendant while
he sat in a bus, and asked him if they could inspect his ticket and identification); see also United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1980) (noting that the defendant was approached by federal agents, who
engaged her in a consensual conversation).
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being stopped, and thus the coercive nature of the encounter is less prominent. 27
Robinette's scenario was distinguishable because he was properly seized pursuant
to the traffic stop,t28 and thus there was some ambiguity as to when the lawful
detention ended and the "consensual encounter" began. "That the officer lacks legal
license to continue to detain [drivers] is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable
person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him."'
29
Thus, in contrast to United States v. Mendenhall,'3 where the defendant had no
objective reason to believe she was seized prior to the initial questioning,'
3
1
Robinette was actually seized, and, arguably, continued to be seized when
Newsome requested the consent to search.
4. Justice Sweeney's Dissent
Justice Sweeney dissented, relying in part on the fact that Robinette testified
that he felt as if he was free to leave once Newsome handed back his license. 32
Justice Sweeney saw no purpose behind the majority's adoption of the bright line
rule, and he supported the "totality of the circumstances" approach previously
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court. 33 Further, Justice Sweeney
believed that Newsome's technique for obtaining consent was particularly useful
because "[t]his technique... is employed on a daily basis throughout this nation to
interdict the flow of drugs.' ' 134 So long as the technique is not coercive, Justice
Sweeney would treat the consent given as being voluntary. 3 5 He further stated that
the "bright line test" undercuts police authority and severely curtails an important
law enforcement tool that is sanctioned by state and federal constitutional law.'
136
127. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698-99.
128. See id. at 696 (noting that Robinette was pulled over for speeding); see also id. at 697 (stating that
Newsome "certainly had cause to pull over Robinette for speeding"). See generally Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding that it is reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, for the police
to stop a car if they have probable cause to believe that the person driving has violated a traffic law).
129. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
130. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
131. Id. at 555.
132. Robinette 1I, 653 N.E.2d at 700 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). At the suppression hearing, Robinette testified
that, although he at first felt free to leave, the question regarding the consent to search shocked him, and he
automatically affirmed Officer Newsome's request for consent to search. Id. at 696. Robinette further testified that
he did not feel that he could refuse the officer's request. Id.
133. Id. at 700 (Sweeney, J., dissenting); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (utilizing a
totality of the circumstances test for seizures of persons); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (adopting a totality of the
circumstances test for seizures of persons); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (stating that
the totality of the circumstances test is the proper test for determining the validity of consent to search).
134. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 700 (Sweeney J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 701.
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5. Conclusions About Robinette II
Under the particular facts of Robinette, the majority reasoned that when a
defendant is initially seized, and the officer continues with a "consensual con-
versation" after the seizure is completed, there needs to be some tool to inform the
defendant when the encounter becomes consensual.'37 However, the majority's rule
did not create a one-factor approach to these cases. An analysis of the majority
opinion demonstrates three things. First, the Ohio Supreme Court found that
Robinette was unlawfully seized because Officer Newsome had completed the valid
stop and had no articulable facts to constitute reasonable suspicion 38 to allow him
to continue the seizure further by pulling Robinette out of his vehicle.' 39 Second,
after the court decided that Robinette was unlawfully seized, and that his consent
to search was invalid as a fruit of the unlawful seizure, the court then announced its
bright line rule.140 Thus, there is little support for the contention that, in Robinette's
case, the bright line rule had any effect on deciding the validity of the seizure or the
validity of Robinette's consent to search.1
41
Finally, since the court favorably cited Mendenhall42 and stated that its bright
line rule was intended only to clarify the point between the end of a seizure and the
beginning of a consensual interrogation, t43 it would seem that the court did not
intend to completely abrogate the totality of the circumstances test for seizures.
Rather, the Ohio Supreme Court likely attempted to fashion a bright line rule that
would make the warning a condition precedent, or sine qua non, to a finding of no
seizure under the circumstances. If the warning was given, yet subsequent conduct
by the police would make the subject feel as if she was not free to leave, then pre-
sumably, there could still be a seizure.
C. United State Supreme Court: Robinette III
1. Seizure Issue and the Bright Line Rule
In its review of the case, the United States Supreme Court discussed, inter alia,
whether the Federal Constitution requires an officer to inform a lawfully seized
driver that he is free to leave in order for a subsequent consent to search to be
137. See id. at 698 (stating that "this case demonstrates the need for this court to draw a bright line rule
between the conclusion of a valid seizure and the beginning ofa consensual exchange").
138. See infra notes 173, 217 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of reasonable suspicion).
139. Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
140. Id.; see Robinette 111, 519 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("As I read the state court opinion,
however, the prophylactic rule announced in the second syllabus was intended as a guide to the decision of future
cases rather than an explanation of the decision in this case.").
141. Robinette II1, 519 U.S. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
143. Id.
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valid.' In a remarkably short opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court relied on its
previous cases which had adopted a totality of the circumstances test to resolve the
issues of whether a person is seized under the Fourth Amendment and whether
consent to search is voluntarily given. 45 The Court explained that it has "long held
that the 'touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."",1
46
"Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality
of the circumstances."' 47 The Court argued that it has "consistently eschewed
bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry."' 48 Further, the Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte for the proposition
that it has "previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search."'
49
Just as it was found to be "impractical to impose on the normal consent search
the detailed requirements of an effective warning,"'"5 "it [would] be unrealistic to
require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a
consent to search may be deemed voluntary."' 5' The Court then concluded that
since the totality of the circumstances test was not applied by the Ohio Supreme
Court, and because that is the test required by the Federal Constitution, the Ohio
Supreme Court's rule must fail. 52 However, the Court did not say that knowledge
of a right to refuse consent or of a right to leave is irrelevant. Rather, such
knowledge is a factor to consider within the totality of the circumstances test. 3
144. Robinette II!, 519 U.S. at 35 ("We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth Amendment
requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is 'free to go' before his consent to search will be
recognized as voluntary. Ve hold that-it does not.").
145. Id. at 39 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,439 (1991). and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S.
218, 248-49 (1973)).
146. Id. (quoting Florida v. Jimeno. 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
147. Id.
148. Id. The Court utilized Michigan it Chesternut. 486 U.S. 567 (1988), Florida it Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983), and Florida i Bostick. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). as examples of cases where it had refused to adopt bright line
rules, and it further used the cases to emphasize the argument that there is no "litmus-paper test" for Fourth
Amendment problems because of the innumerable factual scenarios which implicate that Amendment. Royer.460 U.S.
at 506. But see Maryland v. Wilson. - U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 n.1 (1997) (stating that although "we typically
avoid per se rules concerning searches and seizures does not mean that we have always done so"). Wilson was
decided only two months after Robinette.
149. Robinette 1I, 519 U.S. at 39. see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (rejecting a bright line rule which would
require a person to have knowledge of a right to refuse consent for his subsequent grant of consent to be valid). The
Schneckloth opinion further stated that "[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into
account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qta non of. an effective consent.' Id.
150. Robinette I11, 519 U.S. at 39 (quoting Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 227).
151. Id. at 39-40.
152. Id. at 40.
153. Id. The opinion does not explicitly say this, but its use of the totality of the circumstances test and its
favorable citation to Schneckloth implicitly indicate that a detainee's knowledge that he is free to leave is relevant
in the "seizure' inquiry. Id.
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2. Consent to Search Issue
Since the Court found that the Ohio Supreme Court relied on federal grounds
to determine the seizure issue,154 and that the Ohio Supreme Court applied the
wrong test under federal law for determining whether Robinette was seized, the
Court could have ended its opinion there. Instead, the Court continued by adhering
to Schneckloth v. Bustanonte155 and its rule that adopted the totality of the circum-
stances test as the proper inquiry for determining whether consent to search was
given voluntarily. 5 6 According to the Court, the Ohio Supreme Court erred when
it found Robinette's consent to be invalid as a product of the unlawful seizure; it
should have applied the totality of the circumstances test to both the seizure and
consent to search issues. Because the state court did not, the Court reversed the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision.'57
3. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg made clear that the opinion of the majority
"does not pass judgment on the wisdom of the first-tell-then-ask rule. [It] simply
clarifies that the Ohio Supreme Court's instruction to police officers in Ohio is not
... the command of the Federal Constitution."'58 Justice Ginsburg chose to concur
because she was not clear on whether the intention of the state supreme court was
to mandate a new rule under the Federal Constitution.'59 Ginsburg compared the
bright line rule adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court to the rule from Miranda v.
Arizona,t16 in that both rules are essentially prophylactic.' 6 ' But, unlike the United
States Supreme Court, "the Ohio Supreme Court is not similarly situated. That
court can declare prophylactic rules governing the conduct of officials in Ohio, but
it cannot command the police forces of sister States."' 62 Finally, Justice Ginsburg
stressed that the Ohio Supreme Court, on remand, could mold the opinion unam-
154. Id. at 37.
155. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
156. Robinette II1, 519 U.S. at 40 (citing Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 248.49).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
159. Il. at 42-43 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
160. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda created a bright line rule regarding interrogations which requires police
officers, during custodial interrogation, to provide procedural safeguards which will effectively protect the suspect's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 478-79: see DRESSLER. supra note II. § 24.04[B (stating
concisely the Miranda rule and its requirement of "procedural safeguards").
161. Robinette ll1. 519 U.S. at 43 (Ginsburg, ., concurring): see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298. 306 (1985)
(stating that "[t]heMiranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.") (footnote omitted);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-45 (1974) (finding that an officer's failure to give adequate Miranda warnings
violated Miranda but did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). See generally
DRESSLER. supra note 11, § 24.06 (discussing the Constitutional basis for Miranda).
162. Robinete 111, 519 U.S. at 43 (Ginsburg, .. concurring).
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biguously on state grounds, thus clearly making it the law applicable only in that
state. t63
4. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with what he felt was the narrow holding
of the Court: "The Federal Constitution does not require that a lawfully seized
person be advised that he is 'free to go' before his consent to search will be
recognized as voluntary."' His problem was with the Court's finding that the
prophylactic rule announced by the Ohio Supreme Court was utilized to solve
Robinette's case. 65 "[It] is important to emphasize that nothing in the Federal
Constitution... prevents a State from requiring its law enforcement officers to give
detained motorists the advice mandated by the Ohio court."'
166
Justice Stevens found "several circumstances" that supported the Ohio Supreme
Court's finding that the detention was unlawful prior to the request to consent to
search. t67 He argued that people generally do not feel free to leave when the police
continue to interrogate them, and that the police retain the upper hand in such
situations, thus making it even less likely that detained motorists will feel free to
go. 68 Justice Stevens also found support for concluding that Robinette was seized
in the fact that most drivers are in a hurry to get to their destinations, and thus they
would not likely extend the stop beyond what they felt was legal. 69 Furthermore,
most drivers would not want police looking within their vehicles regardless of
whether there is contraband in the car. 7
Finally, the fact that Newsome previously used similar conduct 786 times in
one year'7 ' (assuming that people would not willingly surrender their privacy
interests if they knew they had no reason to do so) shows that these people likely
163. Id. at 44-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
164. Id. at45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. In the words of Justice Stevens: "As I read the state [supreme] court opinion, however, the
prophylactic rule announced in the second syllabus was intended as a guide to the decision of future cases rather
than an explanation of the decision in this case." Id.
166. Id. at 44-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 46-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Officer Newsome's initial question was prefaced with the statement
"before you get gone[,]" thus implying to Robinette that he was not free to leave; Robinette had been detained; he
received no advice that he was free to leave; he was standing in front of a video camera in response to Newsome's
order to do so. Id. All of these facts tended to show that a reasonable person in Robinette's shoes would not have
felt free to leave. Id. Therefore, the finding was consistent with the totality of the circumstances test. Id. at 46-47.
168. See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("That the officer lacks legal'license to continue to detain them is
unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to
address him."); id. at 47 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing this point further).
169. Id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 502 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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did not feel as if they were free to go. 72 Thus, as Justice Stevens contended, there
was adequate factual support for the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude under the
totality of the circumstances test that Robinette was seized for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Because this analysis and conclusion preceded the introduction
of the bright line rule in the Ohio Supreme Court opinion, inferentially, the con-
clusion was not affected by the bright line rule that the court subsequently adopted.
Justice Stevens noted why he believed the majority thought that the state court
applied the wrong test. In its first syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that when
the officer's "motivation" for the continued detention is no longer related to the
purpose of the original stop, if there are no new articulable facts creating reasonable
suspicion'73 to justify a continued detention, then the continued detention is
unlawful. 74 The majority read "motivation" to mean "subjective intention."
However, the recent decision in Whren v. United States175 made this interpretation
irrelevant for purposes of federal constitutional law. 76 Justice Stevens suggested
that the word "justification" should be read into the passage in place of
"motivation" to evince what the Ohio Supreme Court truly meant to say.' 77 The
reading would then be consistent with Whren.178 "As an objective matter, it
inexorably follows that when the officer had completed his task of either arresting
or reprimanding the driver ... his continued detention of that person constituted an
illegal seizure."' 7 9 Thus, for Justice Stevens, this was a "garden-variety" seizure,
which the Ohio Supreme Court resolved based upon the totality of the
circumstances.' 80
Justice Stevens then focused on the bright line rule. Agreeing with Justice
Ginsburg, he did not think that the majority was passing upon the prudence of the
172. Robinette IlL. 519 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (stating that "[rlepeated decisions by ordinary
citizens to surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any hypothesis other than an assumption that
they believed they had a legal duty to do so").
173. See Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 30 (1968) (stating that an officer is justified in briefly detaining a person
if she has suspicion, based upon his observing "unusual conduct:' which leads her to reasonably believe, in light of
her experience and knowledge, that crime may be afoot, or leads her to believe that the person he is dealing with may
be armed and dangerous).
174. Robinette II. 519 U.S. at 49 (Stevens. J.. dissenting) (citing Robinette I1, 653 N.E.2d at 696).
175. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
176. See Robinette III 519 U.S. at 38 ("ITIhe subjective intentions of the officer did not make the continued
detention of respondent illegal under the Fourth Amendment.").
177. Id. at 49 (Stevens. J.. dissenting): see Robinene IV. 685 N.E.2d at 767 (modifying the first syllabus from
Robiette iI, 653 N.E.2d at 696. to read "objective justification" instead of "motivation" as suggested by Justice
Stevens in Robinette !11, 519 U.S. at 49).
178. In his footnote 8. Justice Stevens pointed to two cases which supported this proposition. One case was
Florida v Royer, 460 U.S. 491.500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (stating "an investigative detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"). The other was United States v Brignoni.
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 881 (1975) (stating that a "stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the
justification for litsl initiation" (quoting Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 29 (1968))). Robinette III. 519 U.S. at 50 n.8.
179. Robinette Il. 519 U.S. at 50-51 (Stevens. J.. dissenting).
180. Id. at 46.
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bright line rule as a matter of state constitutional law.'8' He also stated that nothing
would prevent the states from adopting greater protections for their citizens.182 His
principal reason for agreeing with the majority as to the bright line rule was that he
too thought that the Federal Constitution does not require such a prophylactic
rule.1
83
D. Ohio Supreme Court on Remand: Robinette IV
On November 12, 1997, the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered its Robinette II
holding,'84 but this time in a way consistent with the United States Supreme Court's
admonitions. The Ohio Supreme Court could have followed the suggestion given
by both Justices Stevens and Ginsburg by settling the decision on state grounds,
while retaining the bright line rule. Instead, the court took a different approach that
ultimately made the situation even more precarious for citizens, police, and the
courts.
In Robinette IV, 85 the Ohio Supreme Court modified its syllabi from Robinette
II in order to make its decision comport with federal law. For the first syllabus, the
court amended the language to read "objective justification" instead of "moti-
vation," the problematic word written in Robinette II that was criticized by the
United States Supreme Court.'8 6 In the second syllabus, the court vacated the bright
line rule it adopted in Robinette I, and instead utilized a totality of the circum-
stances test for determining whether a person is seized.
87
Finally, in the third syllabus, the court adopted an "independent act test" in
order to determine whether consent to search obtained as a result of an unlawful
seizure is independently valid. 88 "Once an individual has been unlawfully detained
by law enforcement, for his or her consent to be considered an independent act of
free will, the totality of the circumstances must clearly demonstrate that a rea-
181. Id. at 53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I] agree that it is not [the Supreme Court's] function to pass
judgment on the wisdom of such rules.").
182. See id. at 52-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that there is nothing preventing the state court from
adopting such a rule because they help police and the courts to determine the validity of a seizure); see also id. at
42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that a state may, under its own laws, impose greater restrictions on police
activity than the federal constitution).
183. Id. at 53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995).
185. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997).
186. Id. at 764; Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 696. See Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 38-39 (stating that the correct
test is not subjective motivation, but rather whether the officer had an objective justification). But see Robinette 111,
519 U.S. at 49-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state supreme court really intended "motivation" to
mean "objective justification").
187. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 764.
188. Id.
919
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sonable person" would feel free to refuse further questions and could in fact
leave."8 9
1. Seizure Issue
In reaching its decision regarding the seizure issue, the Ohio Supreme Court
had to initially determine "whether [its] prior holding should be reaffirmed under
the adequate and independent ground" of the Ohio State Constitution. 19' Although
noting a trend for state courts to adopt broader state constitutional protections for
their citizens,' 9' the court stated that "where the [constitutional] provisions are
similar and no persuasive reason for a differing interpretation is presented, this
court has determined that protections afforded by Ohio's Constitution are
coextensive with those [of the federal constitution]." 92 Because the court found no
special reason to expand the Ohio State Constitution's protections, it decided to
"harmonize [its] interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with
the Fourth Amendment."'
93
The court then went on to apply federal law in a similar fashion as the United
States Supreme Court did in Robinette III. For this, the court utilized the amended
rule from syllabus one, which forced it to look at each stage of the encounter
between Robinette and Officer Newsome to determine if the "objective justi-
fication" for the continued detention was related to the justification for the original
stop. 94 As the court noted, there was no question as to the initial stop and the
request for Robinette to exit the vehicle.' 95 However, the court's subsequent
analysis is quite anomalous.
The court next reviewed Officer Newsome's continued detention of Robinette
by focusing on his purpose for interrogating Robinette as to whether he was in
possession of any contraband. 96 To answer this, the court likened Robinette's
scenario to that of a sobriety checkpoint, in that the drug interdiction purpose has
a substantial governmental value, yet the incremental degree of the intrusion is
relatively slight. This approach allowed the court to adopt a suspicionless seizure
rule. 197 "Royer and Brown set out a standard whereby police officers... may briefly
detain an individual without reasonably articulable facts giving rise to suspicion of
189. Id.
190. Id. at 766.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 767.
194. In framing the issue this way, the Court must have assumed that the extended "detention" constituted
a seizure. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 767-68. The Court stated the issue as "[whether] Officer Newsome [was] objectively justified,...
in detaining Robinette after administering the verbal warning." Id. at 767.
197. Id. at 768 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). The Court also cited Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S.
491 (1983), stating that the minimal intrusion caused by questioning a person not in custody is not a "seizure." Id.
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criminal activity, if the detention promotes a legitimate public concern," ' 98 such as
reducing the drug trade. Thus, under the Brown test, Officer Newsome was justified
in asking Robinette whether he had contraband.
Next, the court focused on the consent to search request as a separate issue. 99
It noted that Officer Newsome knew of no facts that could give rise to reasonable
suspicion to allow Newsome to further detain Robinette after he had satisfactorily
answered the questions regarding contraband. 200 Applying the Brown test, the court
concluded that Officer Newsome was not justified in detaining Robinette to request
consent to search, thus making the seizure during this last question unlawful.0 1
2. Consent to Search Issue
Although it found Robinette's seizure to be unlawful, the court continued its
analysis by determining whether Robinette's subsequent consent to search validated
the otherwise illegal detention and search.0 2 It quickly disposed of Robinette's
contention that the "free to go rule ' 203 from Robinette Hwould make determinations
of validity of consent to search more predictable. The court stated: "We find that
Robinette's conclusion is based on an oversimplified approach to the issue of
consent. ' 2 4 It then adopted the rule and the reasoning from Schneckloth.0 5
Additionally, the court cited Royer,2°6 indicating that "the burden of proving that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, [is] a
burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful
authority.
'20 7
The court then analyzed the facts of Robinette, relying heavily on Robinette's
testimony at the suppression hearing.208 It found that "Newsome's words did not
give Robinette any indication that he was free to go,''209 but instead indicated to him
that he would only be free to go once he answered the additional questions. In
198. Id. (italics added). The Court's use of Brown it Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), is troubling, however,
because there the issue was whether the police had specific, articulatable facts which amounted to reasonable
suspicion justifying them to detain the defendant. Id. at 51-52. The Ohio Supreme Court was relying solely on the
dicta in Brown, which argued that "a seizure may be reasonable within the confines of the Fourth Amendment
despite the absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity if the seizure satisfies a balance
between 'the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law
officers."' Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 772 (Cook, J., concurring) (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50).
199. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 768.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 769 (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,593-94 (1946)).
203. See supra note 124 (containing the text of the rule).
204. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 769.
205. Id. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the facts, rule, and reasoning in the Schneckloth decision).
206. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
207. Robineite IV, 685 N.E.2d at 770 (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 497) (emphasis omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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addition, Newsome's "superior position of authority,"2'0 when combined with the
language of the questioning, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he must
answer the questions. "From the totality of the circumstances, it appears that
Robinette merely submitted to a 'claim of lawful authority' rather than consenting
as a voluntary act of free will."'2n Thus his consent to search was invalid.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ROBINETTE HI MAJORITY OPINION
As intimated in the above discussion, the issue for the Ohio Supreme Court in
Robinette Hand Robinette V, and for the Ohio Court of Appeals in Robinette I, was
whether Robinette was lawfully seized when Officer Newsome requested consent
to search Robinette's vehicle. 1  Since the facts indicated that the purpose for the
original seizure no longer existed when the "conversation" began,2"3 and since there
were no facts indicating that Officer Newsome had particularized suspicion to allow
a further detention, the courts narrowed the issue to whether Robinette was seized
at all.
2 14
In resolving this issue, both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme
Court looked to federal and state precedent to determine whether a reasonable
person in Robinette's shoes would have felt free to leave .21  Again, both of the state
courts found facts sufficient to support a finding that a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave, thus both courts concluded that Robinette was seized. 6
Since the seizure was not based on any particularized suspicion, it was unlawful
under Terry v. Ohio.217 After finding that Robinette was unlawfully seized, the
210. Id. at 771.
211. Id.
212. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 767; Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d at 697; Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *
1.
213. See Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697 (stating that the purpose of the traffic stop had ended, and Newsome
attempted to engage Robinette in a consensual conversation).
214. See id. (discussing the lack of reasonable articulable suspicion when Newsome engaged Robinette in
the extended detention). Given that there were no articulable facts constituting at a minimum reasonable suspicion,
under Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, if Robinette was in fact seized, the seizure likely would have been unlawful.
215. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (concluding that "a person has been 'seized'
... only if, in view of all the circumstances.., a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave") (Rehnquist, J., plurality). This rule was adopted by a majority of the Court in Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,439 (1991) (holding that "to determine whether a particular encounter
constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether
... a reasonable person . . . [would have] felt free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter"). The Ohio Supreme Court also relied upon State v. Chatton, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio 1984). Robinette
II, 653 N.E.2d at 697. The Ohio Court of Appeals relied upon Chatton and State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
216. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 770; Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697-98; Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at
*2.
217. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding "that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him to reasonably conclude.., that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing
may be armed and presently dangerous," he may briefly stop the persons, make reasonable inquiries designed to
922
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question for the Ohio courts then became whether the application of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine"2' 8 would make the consent given by Robinette invalid. 9
As the Ohio courts held, the consent was invalid under this doctrine. 20
In Robinette III, the United States Supreme Court noted that Robinette failed
to argue that the valid detention had become an invalid seizure once Newsome,
having already determined that he was going to issue a warning, asked Robinette
to get out of the car anyway.22' Regardless, the Court saw the issue "[regarding] the
continuing legality of the detention [as] a 'predicate to an intelligent resolution' of
the question presented, and therefore 'fairly included therein."' 2
In its analysis of the seizure issue, the Court focused on the bright line rule
announced by the Ohio Supreme Court opinion.22 It found that the Ohio Supreme
Court's use of the word "motivation" in syllabus one224 indicated an improper rule
because "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis." Further, the Court found that there was no issue regarding
Newsome's request for Robinette to get out of the vehicle, because Pennsylvania
v. Mimms2 6 made it clear that, pursuant to a valid traffic stop, an officer may
command the driver out of the vehicle as a matter of course.27 Thus, from the
Court's perspective, none of Officer Newsome's acts up to and including the point
of commanding Robinette from the car were per se unlawful.
Next the Court reiterated its emphasis on reasonableness, and-its persistence in
eschewing bright line rules.228 At no point did the Court utilize the totality of the
circumstances test to determine whether the Ohio Supreme Court found that a
either support or dispel his beliefs, and conduct a "carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him").
218. For general principles regarding this doctrine, see DRESSLER, supra note 11, § 21.08. See also Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (stating that "[i]n order to make effective the fundamental
constitutional guarantees [of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule provides that] evidence seized during
an unlawful search [cannot] constitute proof against the victim of the search"). "[This prohibition] extends as well
to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions." Id. at 484 (citation omitted). See generally 5 LAFAVE, supra
note 61, § 11.4, at 231 (stating that in many cases, challenged evidence is secondary to the evidence gained by the
initial illegality, and in such instances "it is necessary to determine whether the [secondary] evidence is 'tainted'
by the prior Fourth Amendment violation").
219. See Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698 (determining that the consent given by Robinette was a result of his
illegal detention and thus invalid); see also Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *2 (holding similarly that "[b]ecause
the search ... resulted from an unlawful detention, it is the fruit of an unlawful seizure").
220. Robinette 1I, 653 N.E.2d at 698; Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *2.
221. Robinette 111, 519 U.S. at 38 (citing Sup. Cr. R. 15.2).
222. Id. (quoting Sup. Cr. R. 14.1(a); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 258-59 n.5 (1980)).
223. Id. at 39 (discussing the need, or lack thereof, of the bright line rule as a matter of federal constitutional
law).
224. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
225. Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 38 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
226. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
227. Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 38-39 (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 n.6) ("We hold... that once a motor
vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the
vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.").
228. Id. at39.
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reasonable person in Robinette's place would not have felt free to leave. But it is
clear from looking at both Robinette I and II that both Ohio courts resolved the
issue of the validity of the consent by finding that Robinette was unlawfully
seized,22 9 thus making the subsequent consent tainted by this unlawful police
conduct.230 The bright line rule was not meant to address the facts of Robinette's
case, and thus the United States Supreme Court's finding that it was invalid, as
applied here, was erroneous; the rule simply was not applied in Robinette's case. 2
1
A. Viewing Robinette III as a Case About Consent to Search
Finding that there was no continued seizure, the Supreme Court went on to
discuss the validity of the bright line rule as a consent to search rule.232 The leading
case concerning the issue of whether consent to search is validly given is
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.23 In that case, the police stopped six men in an
automobile for having a headlight and license plate light burned out.234 The owner
229. Note that the Ohio Court of Appeals found that, given the totality of the circumstances, Robinette would
not have felt free to leave. Robinette 1, 1994 WL 147806, at *2. The Ohio Supreme Court found that Robinette was
unlawfully seized when OfficerNewsome, withoutjustification, requested that Robinette exit the vehicle. Robinette
1I, 653 N.E.2d at 698. That court did not discuss whether this act amounted to a seizure under the Mendenhall test.
Perhaps the court thought that it was beyond question that Robinette would reasonably believe that he was not free
to leave when he was commanded from his vehicle.
230. See Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d at 698 (stating that, "[g]iven the circumstances, Robinette felt that he had
no choice but to comply"); see also id. (asserting further that "[t]his case demonstrates the need for this court to
draw a bright line"). The Ohio Supreme Court concluded its analysis based upon a totality of the circumstances test,
then it went on to state the bright line rule. Id. The result is that the bright line rule had no impact on the outcome
of the case. See also Robinette 111, 519 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (supporting this conclusion). But see id.
at 40 (implying that the bright line rule did have an impact on the outcome of the decision).
231. During oral arguments, the State argued that syllabus one was intertwined with syllabus two of the Ohio
Supreme Court opinion. Official Transcript at *14-15, Robinette II, 519 U.S. 33 (No. 95-391). It argued that the
rule in syllabus two was used to determine whether Robinette was unlawfully detained. Id. Since the Ohio Supreme
Court speaks through its syllabi, Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 37 (citations omitted), the actual opinion is only dicta,
but it does have interpretive value. See Official Transcript at *15, Robinette 11I, 519 U.S. 33 (No. 95-891). By
reading the opinion, the Court could interpret whether syllabus two had been used to determine the issue of
Robinette's continued detention. Thus, the State lacked a convincing argument that the bright line rule was
necessary to the outcome of the case.
232. See Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 40 ("The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the
consent be voluntary, and '[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances."')
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)); id. ("The Supreme Court of Ohio having held
otherwise, its judgment is reversed .. "). It seems that the Court believed the bright line rule created by the Ohio
Supreme Court would negate any consent given subsequent to a lawful detentiori if the advice that the suspect was
free to go had not been given. The Ohio Supreme Court likely did not intend such a rule. Rather, it likely intended
a rule which would make any further detention unlawful, thus requiring the magistrate at a suppression hearing to
determine whether the subsequent consent to search was sufficiently free from the taint of the unlawful seizure to
be valid independent of the seizure. It likely did not intend to create a per se rule invalidating all consent under
these circumstances. The Ohio Supreme Court's application of the attenuation doctrine supports this. Robinette II,
653 N.E.2d at 698.
233. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
234. Id. at 220.
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of the car was not one of the occupants, but when the officer requested consent to
search the vehicle, a passenger of the vehicle, the brother of the owner, replied,
"Sure, go ahead." 235 In the search of the trunk, the officer discovered three checks,
which had previously been stolen from a car wash, wadded up under the left rear
seat. 6
The trial judge denied Bustamonte's motion to suppress this evidence, the
checks were admitted at his trial, and he was subsequently convicted. 237 A
California appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the totality of the
circumstances test is the correct standard to apply when determining whether
consent to search was voluntarily given.23 The California Supreme Court denied
review in an unreported opinion. 9
Bustamonte sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, but was denied review in another unreported
opinion. The Ninth Circuit reversed the state court of appeals decision, stating that
the California courts had not determined that the subject knew that he could refuse
consent.240
In its review of the Ninth Circuit decision, the United States Supreme Court saw
the issue as "what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was
'voluntarily' given. ' 24' The Court relied, in part, upon the due process line of con-
2423fession cases" to construct a definition for a "voluntary" consent to search.243
Noting that "[the] cases yield no talismanic definition of 'voluntariness,' mec-
hanically applicable to the host of situations where the question has arisen," 244 the
Court stated that the concept of voluntary consent "[could not] be taken literally to
mean a 'knowing' choice."
245
The Court reviewed numerous factors previously used in determining whether
a given confession was coerced, but most importantly argued that "[t]he significant




238. Id. at 220-21.
239. Id. at221.
240. Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 E2d 699, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1971), rei'd, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
241. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223. But see id. at 282 (Marshall J., dissenting) (arguing that "[c]onsent,
however, is a mechanism by which substantive requirements, otherwise applicable, are avoided"). Thus, he argued,
the Fifth Amendment coercion standard is inappropriate for determining whether consent to search was voluntarily
given. See also Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 723, 793 n.327 (1992) (arguing that the Court in Schneckloth stated the issue in a grossly misleading way,
thus allowing it to reach the desired conclusion).
242. Among the due process confession cases relied upon in Schneckloth are Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961), Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223-27 (utilizing these confession cases).
243. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223 (citation omitted).
244. Id. at 224.
245. Id.
925
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absence of a single controlling criterion. 246 Thus, the Court concluded that
knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a factor to consider in determining the
voluntariness question, but such knowledge is not "the sine qua non of an effective
consent."'247
To support the proposition that consent searches are advantageous, the Court
relied upon various justifications. The Court's ultimate concern was belied by "the
legitimate need for [consent] searches and the equally important requirement of
assuring the absence of coercion." 248 Of particular concern was the situation where
the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but not sufficient evidence to
amount to probable cause.249 In such cases, gaining consent to search may be the
only way that police can obtain important and reliable evidence.2 0 Further, "a
search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the
subject of the search."'
The Court refused to adopt the Sixth Amendment standard for "waiver"
espoused in Johnson v. Zerbst.252 It first found that the Zerbst "knowing and
intelligent waiver" test, which is applied in a "context of the safeguards of a
criminal trial," 3 is not applied in every context. Because the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment is "to preserve the fairness of the trial process,"5 4 the Court decided
to establish a particularly heavy burden for the prosecution.2 5 By contrast, the Court
has not chosen to apply this heavy burden where the ability of the defendant to
receive a fair trial is not at issue. 6
Additionally, and of special significance, "[t]he protections of the Fourth
Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with
promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. 257 The Fourth
Amendment protections do not implicate the problems inherent in the truth finding
process at trial because the physical evidence is not suspect, whereas the result of
246. Id. at 226 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 508 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); id. (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 534-35 (White, J., dissenting)).




251. Id. at 228.
252. See id. at 235 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (holding that, to prove that a defendant
waived his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial, the state must prove that he competently and intelligently
waived the right)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 236.
255. Id. at 236-37.
256. Id. at 241-42.
257. See id. at 242 (stating that "[t]he guarantees of the Fourth Amendment stand 'as a protection of quite
different constitutional values-values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be
let alone"') (quoting Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)).
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a trial is suspect if a defendant has not been provided his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.28
Then, the Court argued that it would be nearly impossible to apply the Zerbst
standard in a consent to search context.259 Relying on the dynamic of informal
police-citizen encounters, the Court argued that "[i]t would be unrealistic to expect
that in ... [that] context .... a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence
obtained, could make the detailed type of examination demanded by [Zerbst]."260
Finally, the Court argued that Miranda is not analogous to the consent to search
issue presented because "[i]n this case, there [was] no evidence of any inherently
coercive tactics-either from the nature of the police questioning or the environ-
ment in which it took place.' 26 Thus, the Court narrowly held that "when the
subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the
basis of his consent, ... it [must] demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given.... [and] [v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances. 262 "[W]hile the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse
is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate
such knowledge... to [establish] a voluntary consent.,
263
258. See id. at 242-43 (stating that:
[N]or can it even be said that a search, as opposed to an eventual trial, is somehow "unfair" if a person
consents to a search. While the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments limit the circumstances under which
the police can conduct a search, there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily
allowing a search.
see also Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is necessary to protect the fair
ascertainment of truth because
[the defendant] is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether [his] indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue
or otherwise inadmissible.).
259. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243.
260. Id. at 245.
261. Id. at 247. Since the Miranda Court developed its holding based upon the premise that custodial
interrogations are inherently coercive, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, the Court's argument in Schneckloth was that the
lack of ail inherently coercive environment under the facts of the present case made informing the suspect of his
right to refuse consent unnecessary. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247.
262. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
263. Id. at 249. Indeed, the argument has been made that the mere request for permission to search carries
with it the implication that the person has the right to withhold consent to search. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and
Seizures § 85 (1993). This argument affects the assertion made by the Schneckloth Court that the police officer
advising the subject of the right to refuse consent would somehow have a disastrous impact on the informality of
the encounter. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32. How could explicit advice of rights have some significantly
increased impact on the informal police-citizen encounter when the officer has impliedly given the advice in his
request for a consensual search?
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3. Criticism of Schneckloth
In justifying a totality of the circumstances test, the Schneckloth Court relied
on several justifications. This Comment considers the validity of these justifications
at the time of Schneckloth, and re-examines them in light of Robinette.
a. The Court's Reliance on the Coerced Confession Cases Was
Unsupported
One of the primary reasons why the Court decided not to adopt the Zerbst
standard of "knowing and intelligent waiver" was that it found the due process
confession cases to be illustrative in that they utilized a "totality of the circum-
stances" test to determine whether a confession was voluntarily given .264 "While the
state of the accused's mind, and the failure of the police to advise [him] of his
rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated.., they were not in and of themselves
determinative.
' 265
What the Court failed to do was to state why the coerced confession cases are
even illustrative in the Fourth Amendment analysis. The problem with using the
coerced confession cases is that a person does-not waive her right to be free of
coercion during a confession. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in
Schneckloth, "[t]he inquiry in a case where a confession is challenged as having
been elicited in an unconstitutional manner is... whether the behavior of the police
amounted to compulsion of the defendant. ' '266 In confession cases, courts never
discuss the question of whether a person knew she had a right to be free of
compulsion.2 67 Thus, the question of whether the suspect "waived" her substantive
right to be free of compulsion is never an issue under coerced confession juris-
prudence.
As Justice Marshall noted further, this fact is made even more apparent in the
Miranda context, because a suspect may waive her right to counsel or right to
remain silent, but she still is not able to waive her right to be free from compulsion
in confessions.268 Marshall also pointed out that "consent" is subtly different from
"coercion," in that freedom from coercion is a substantive right, whereas consent
is "a mechanism by which substantive requirements, otherwise applicable, are
avoided.,269 Thus, the question under Fourth Amendment consent to search is
whether a substantive constitutional right has been foregone, whereas the question
264. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224-27.
265. Id. at 227.
266. Id. at 280-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at281.
268. See id. at 281-82 (stating that "nothing the defendant did in the [coerced confession cases] was taken
to operate as a relinquishment of his rights; certainly the fact that the defendant made a statement was never taken
to be a relinquishment of the right to be free of coercion").
269. Id. at 282.
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under coerced confession cases is whether the relevant substantive right has been
violated.
Moreover, the Court's analysis is disingenuous because both the Fifth
Amendment's due process guarantee, as applied in a confession context, and the
Sixth Amendment's right to counsel guarantee, to some extent, protect the same
constitutional interests: ensuring a fair trial and the fair ascertainment of truth. In
Schneckloth, the Court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment protects both
interests.270 Fifth Amendment due process also protects these interests, because one
concern with admitting a coerced confession in a defendant's trial is that the
confession is likely unreliable.27 To this extent, the two Amendments protect
similar interests, and thus the Court's determination to rely on one amendment's
standard for "waiver" rather than the other's, without more, lacked logical support.
b. Legitimate Need of Consent Searches
Another reason why the Court argued for a totality of the circumstances test
was that there is a legitimate law enforcement need for such searches.272 In those
situations where police do not have sufficient evidence amounting to probable
cause, the Court argued "a search authorized by a valid consent may be the only
means of obtaining important reliable evidence. 273 It then utilized the Schneckloth
facts in order to support this view.274 The problem is that the Schneckloth facts
essentially "load the dice" in favor of the majority opinion.275 Had the police found
no evidence or contraband in the vehicle, then their seeking of consent to search in
Schneckloth may have seemed a waste of 'police resources.
276 17ndeProbable cause, and indeed reasonable suspicion,27  at least give the police
an objective basis for believing that some illicit activity is afoot, thus expanding the
number of instances in which a search will likely result in the discovery of
270. Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 236 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458,462-63 (1938)).
271. DRESSLER, supra note 11, § 23.03[B] (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959)).
272. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 227-28 (arguing that, although the police had probable cause to stop the car, there was no
contention that the search was based on probable cause or that it was justified as incident to an arrest); see also id.
at 228 (stating further. "Yet, the search yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution.").
275. See John B. Wefing & John G. Miles, Jr., Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Vlohntariness
and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 211, 249 (1974) (stating that the Scheckloth Court's use of the
fact that evidence was discovered because of the consent search in that case "touches upon the argument that the
Court has eschewed as constitutionally impermissible ... that a search is justifted by what it turns up"). The authors
then cite Justice Jackson's view that "a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad
when it starts and does not change character from its success." Id. at 249 n.243 (citing United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581,595 (1948)).
276. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes probable cause to search).
277. See supra notes 173,217 and accompanying text (reviewing reasonable suspicion).
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incriminating evidence.278 What the Court essentially supports are fishing
expeditions where the police have no reason to believe there is contraband or
reliable evidence, but they engage in a search that will likely result in no evidence
or contraband anyway.279 Thus, the "legitimate need" argument lacks logical
support.
Although it dealt specifically with a seizure issue, State v. Retherford280 is
illustrative here. In that case, Officer Newsome admitted that, in 1992, he requested
consent to search during traffic stops approximately seven hundred and eighty-six
times.281 Newsome's candid testimony established that his reason for requesting
consent to search so many times was that he needed the practice.2 12 This fact
indicates that, for a reason that could hardly be deemed legitimate, Officer
Newsome saw fit to invade the privacy of the defendant based on no suspicion
whatsoever. Thus, there is evidentiary support that illustrates the impropriety of the
legitimate need argument posited by the Schneckloth Court.
To furtherjustify its "legitimate need" argument, the Court argued that in those
cases where the police do have probable cause to search but lack a warrant, a
consent search "may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the
search. '28 3 The problem with this argument is that, even assuming it is true, it still
ignores the substantial inconvenience to those persons whose vehicles the police
search without probable cause to believe they will find any incriminating evidence.
By framing the argument this way, the Court essentially chose to conceal the true
problem with consent searches-the significant invasion that occurs to those
individuals about whom the police have no reasonable suspicions, and yet of whom
the police seek and obtain consent to search anyway. This phenomenon can be
illustrated by considering the relative scopes of searches based upon probable cause
and those based upon consent.
278. Justice Marshall in his Schneckloth dissent noted that
none of the exceptions relating to the overriding needs of law enforcement are applicable when a search
is justified solely by consent. On the contrary, the needs of law enforcement are significantly more
attenuated, for probable cause to search may be lacking but a search permitted if the subject's consent
has been obtained.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 282-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 283 (Marshall J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further argued that "consent searches are permitted,
not because such an exception ... is essential to proper law enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to
choose whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional rights." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
280. 639 N.E.2d 498 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
281. Id. at 502.
282. Id. Note that this statement supports two conclusions. First, the "legitimate need" of practice searches
by police can be anything but reasonable. Second, since the searches were based mainly on his stated need, they
were not primarily based on some belief that he might find incriminating evidence.
283. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
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i. Assuming that the police do have probable cause to search, what
is the scope of that search in the traffic stop context?
Under the "automobile exception," 2 4 if the police have probable cause to
believe a vehicle contains contraband, the police may search the vehicle for the
contraband without a warrant.285 They may search anywhere in the vehicle,
including containers, where the contraband could be contained.286 Thus, the
authorized scope of a search based on probable cause is fairly broad in the
automobile search context and is only limited by the size and nature of the
contraband which the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains.
ii. Assuming, however, the search is based solely upon consent, what
is the scope of the search in the same context?
Florida v. Jimeno 7 is helpful in answering this question. Jimeno held that the
test for determining the scope of a consent search "is that of 'objective'
reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect? '288 Under this standard, the scope of
the search is based upon what the officer reasonably could have believed the
detainee was consenting to. Thus, the scope is not unlimited, rather, "[t]he scope...
is defined by its expressed object., 289 However, an experienced officer who wants
to expand the possible scope of the search can do so by requesting to search for
small objects, like drugs, 290 in order to enlarge the number and types of areas that
could contain the objects he is searching for. Consequently, the scope of a consent
search can be equally as broad as a warrantless "automobile exception" search.29'
The key difference, again, is that the "automobile exception" search requires
probable cause,292 whereas the consent search can be based on no suspicion
284. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-56 (1925) (holding that, based on the ready mobility
of a vehicle stopped on the highway, the police can, if they have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains
contraband, make a warrantless search of the vehicle for the contraband); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 580 (1991) (authorizing the search of "containers" in a vehicle which are large enough to hold the contraband
the police have probable cause to believe is currently in the vehicle).
285. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
286. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580.
287. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
288. Id. at 251; DRESSLER. supra note 1I, § 17.04.
289. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
290. See, e.g., Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 35-36 (discussing how Newsome asked Robinette whether he had
drugs). For examples, in Robinette, Newsome questioned the defendant as to whether he had any drugs, and then
requested consent to search the vehicle. Id. Implicitly, Newsome requested for consent to search the vehicle for
drugs.
291. See, e.g., id. at48 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that. under the Robinette facts, the consent search
was not particularly intrusive, but given the Court's holding in iineno. 500 U.S. 248, a much more intrusive search,
in some cases, may unknowingly be authorized by the person giving consent).
292. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes probable cause to search).
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whatsoever.293 The number of eligible "searchees" in the consent to search scenario
is seemingly unlimited. Thus, when the Court argued in Schneckloth that the
consent search can actually reduce the intrusiveness of an otherwise lawful
"automobile exception" search,294 the Court was being disingenuous; it concealed
the fact that consent searches can be based on no suspicion, and yet can be almost
equally as invasive. Such a search is hardly "less intrusive."
295
c. Advising a Person of his Right to'Refuse Consent Will Not Adversely
Affect the Needs of Law Enforcement
To support its claim that a "voluntary" standard sufficiently protects against
police abuses, the Court argued that having to advise a person of his right to refuse
consent prior to requesting consent to search "would be thoroughly impractical. 296
The Court distinguished the investigatory practice of consent searches from "the
structured atmosphere of a trial, '297 but it failed to state why investigatory situations
require fewer protections, or to otherwise state the significance of the distinction.
The argument said little about the "impracticality" of advising the subject of his
right to refuse consent. Consequently, the Court failed to show how the advising of
this right would be impractical.
Justice Marshall noted in his Schneckloth dissent that informing a suspect of her
right to refuse consent would not likely have an impact on the informality of the
exchange as argued by the majority.298 He pointed to the fact that for years the
Federal Bureau of Investigation "routinely informed subjects of their right to refuse
consent., 299 To Marshall, the cases strongly evidenced the fact that "nothing
293. See supra note 10 (stating that valid consent defeats both the probable cause and the warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
294. See supra notes 10-11 (reviewing the automobile exception).
295. In fact, if the officer had no suspicion warranting a valid search without consent, the consent search of
equal scope is actually infinitely more invasive, because any other search, absent consent, would be unjustified.
296. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32 (asserting that consent searches "normally occur on the highway,
or in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured conditions"). But see id. at 288 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (responding to this assertion by arguing:
[W]hen the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police
to capitalize on the ignorance ofcitizens .... Of course it would be "practical" for the police to ignore
the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we mean that more criminals will be
apprehended, even though the constitutional rights of innocent people also go by the board.);
cf. Maclin. supra note 241, at 795 (noting that the Schneckloth "impracticality" argument was made without any
proof by the Court).
297. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245.
298. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "a simple statement by an officer of an individual's
right to refuse consent would do much to alter the informality of the exchange, except to alert the subject to a fact
that he surely is entitled to know").
299. Id. ("The reported cases in which the police have informed subjects of their right to refuse consent show,
also, that the information can be given without disrupting the casual flow of events.") (citation omitted).
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disastrous would happen if the police.., informed the subject that he had a right
to refuse consent and that his refusal would be respected."3°
Model police procedures similarly support the idea that advising persons of
their freedom to refuse consent has no effect on gaining the consent to search.
Additionally, such an instruction can be beneficial because it substantially increases
the likelihood that the consent will be found voluntary at trial.30 1 Officer
Newsome's testimony in Retherford supports this view as well. In that case,
Newsome testified that "I remember telling her... 'you have a nice day, you're
free to go,"' prior to requesting the consent to search. 02 In describing his typical
procedure for gaining consent to search, Newsome stated that after citing the driver
and returning her license, "I then continue in a casual manner. Once . . . I'm
concluding the conversation, I say you're free to go[.] ... As soon as [she turns
back to her vehicle], I [say], 'Excuse me, can I ask you one more thing before you
go[?] ' ' 30 3 Then he would proceed to request consent to search.
This procedure, which included advising subjects of their right to leave, was
used by Officer Newsome almost eight hundred times in 1992 alone, inferentially
evidencing the method's effectiveness in gaining consent.3° Given the effectiveness
of Newsome's method, it can hardly be argued that informing a driver of his
constitutional rights can have an adverse impact on the ability of the police to gain
consent.30 5 Thus, the Schneckloth Court's argument that police are less likely to gain
consent to search if they advise persons of their freedom to refuse lacks merit. Both
300. Id. at 287-88.
301. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 240.2(2) (1975) (requiring an officer to warn
a suspect of her right to refuse consent, and to warn the suspect that anything found during the search may be seized
and used as evidence against her); id. commentary and accompanying notes (arguing that the inherently coercive
environment, which caused the Court to adopt the Miranda rule, exists in vehicle consent searches, and as such
commands a similar result); id. commentary and accompanying notes (arguing further that "the strongest argument
for requiring a warning is that without undue burden, it will ... avoid confusion"); see also ARNOLD MARKLE, THE
LAW OF ARREST AND SEARCH AND SEIZURE 267 (1974) (concluding that "[i]t would be the better practice to have
law enforcement officers warn the person giving consent that he does not have to allow the search ... and that he
can refuse consent to such a search").
302. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d at 501.
303. Id. Although Officer Newsome's technique was designed to allow him to engage in a consensual
conversation, the warning which he gave to the suspect, that she was free to go, is analogous to a warning that a
person does not have to consent to a search because both warnings indicate to the subject that she has a choice of
conduct which she can lawfully pursue, and that her choice will be respected.
304. Justice Stevens argued in his Robinette dissent:
The fact that this particular officer successfully used a similar method of obtaining consent to search
roughly 786 times in one year. . . indicates that motorists generally respond in a manner that is contrary
to their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to surrender that interest [can only be
explained by the] assumption that they believed that they had a legal duty to do so.
Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
305. See Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 52-53 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that giving a warning
to a detainee that he or she is free to leave is good police practice, and that such a warning is recommended by many
police instructors).
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police procedures and evidence of police conduct in the field support the conclusion
that giving advice is completely practical.
Even if advising a person of her right to refuse consent reduces the number of
instances where police could gain "voluntary" consent, this seems to indicate that,
had the person known that she had a choice to refuse consent, then she would have
exercised that choice. Therefore, informing the person of her right to refuse consent
would only make her decision more meaningful because then her choice to
"voluntarily" consent would be based on the knowledge of an alternative, that of
refusing to consent.
In his Schneckloth dissent, Justice Brennan was astounded at the majority's
holding:
306
The Court holds today that an individual can effectively waive this right
even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his
consent, such invasions of privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It
wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully . .. [waive]
something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being
aware of its existence.0 7
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, also found this holding to be "incomprehensible.
30 8
If anything, the argument that informing a suspect of her right to refuse consent
would reduce the number of instances where consent would be obtained supports
the conclusion that the persons who would not have consented but for their lack of
knowledge of a right to refuse did not make a meaningful choice to voluntarily
allow the search. Thus, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding, informing a sub-
ject of her right to refuse consent should be a prerequisite to finding that the subject
of the search made a meaningful choice to voluntarily consent.
306. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 276-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 277.
308. Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 284-85 (stating further that "[i]f consent to search means
that a person has chosen to forgo his right to exclude the police from the place they seek to search, it follows that
his consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police").
309. This conclusion follows unless, of course, the Court meant "voluntary choice" to be something other
than "meaningful" voluntary choice. That conclusion, however, would seem to be incomprehensible, especially
since the issue regards the voluntary waiver of a constitutional right. Note also that the Court analyzed whether a
warning was the sine qua non of voluntary consent, but it did so mainly by reviewing the need for such a warning
in the context of confession cases. Schneckloih, 412 U.S. at 227-30. The Court discussed the issue of a warning
under a separate "knowing" waiver theory, a lesser standard than the Zerbst knowing and intelligent waiver
standard, but the analysis centered upon the "impracticality" of such a warning. Id. at 231-32. The Court did not
discuss the merits of such a warning, or how a warning could provide meaningful Fourth Amendment protection.
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d. The Court's Argument that a Zerbst Standard of Waiver is
Inappropriate Must Also Fail
I
The Schneckloth Court correctly acknowledged that Zerbst involved a waiver
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and did not stand for the proposition that
the waiver of all constitutional rights must be knowing and intelligent.310 As the
Court noted, "[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different
order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of
truth at a criminal trial .... [T]he Fourth Amendment protects the 'security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by police.... ,,,311
This line of reasoning supports the view that a Zerbst standard of waiver
protects the fair ascertainment of truth, whereas evidence found in a consent search
is already reliable. Thus, there is no reason to extend the Zerbst standard to the
Fourth Amendment context. This reasoning, however, fails to acknowledge that
there can be other significant reasons for extending the Zerbst test to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.312 Simply because the justifications are different does
not logically mean that none exist. 313 Additionally, even though the Court argued
that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a "wholly different order,
', 314
it failed to identify why Fourth Amendment rights do not deserve the same level of
protection as Sixth Amendment rights, or why a lesser degree of protection is
somehow justifiable for Fourth Amendment interests.3 5
The other problem with the Schneckloth Court's analysis of the Zerbst test is
that the Court implied that the only other option, once the Zerbst standard had been
disposed of, was a standard of "voluntariness" for determining validity of consent.
This is supported in the Court's argument that "[iut would be unrealistic to expect
that in the informal, unstructured context of a consent search, a policeman, upon
pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of examination
demanded by [Zerbst]. 31 6 The Court, however, never supported its intimation that
a voluntariness standard and a Zerbst standard were the only two available tests.
310. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237 ("Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and
intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant
in order to preserve a fair trial.").
311. Id. at 242 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
312. See Eugene E. Smary, Note, The Doctrine of Waiver and Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
891, 902 (1974) ("If one were to consider the context of past waiver cases, it would appear that the purpose of the
[Zerbst standard] is to protect fundamental rights. Apparently the Court has now decided that this was mere
rhetoric.").
313. This Comment only seeks to raise this issue; it would be beyond its scope to discuss at length the
justifications for applying a Zerbst standard to consent to search analyses.
314. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242.
315. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 61, at § 8.1(a)(4).
316. Schueckloth, 412 U.S. at 245.
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For example, Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argued for a "knowing choice"
standard for determining voluntariness of consent. 3 7 That standard would be
intermediate in the spectrum ranging from true "voluntariness" to a Zerbst waiver.
Under this test, "the burden on the prosecutor would disappear... if the police, at
the time they requested consent to search, also told the subject that he had a right
to refuse consent and that his decision to refuse would be respected. 3 t8 It is evident
that the Court was focusing on a "knowing and intelligent" standard, whereas a
standard of "knowing choice" might have been sufficient to protect the Fourth
Amendment interests. 3 9 Therefore, the Court's reliance on the inapplicability of
Zerbst to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence improperly implied that the only two
possible standards were "voluntary" and "knowing and intelligent," when in fact the
Court could have adopted a "knowing choice standard" of waiver, which could
adequately protect Fourth Amendment interests.
2. Schneckloth in Light of Robinette Facts
There is substantial literature that criticizes the inherent problems underlying
Schneckloth's rationale,320 yet the United States Supreme Court found no difficulty
in reaffirming its principle in Robinette. Had the Court utilized the principle of
particularjustification, however, it would have likely reached a contrary result. This
Comment will continue by briefly discussing several of Schneckloth's inherent
problems, and how these problems were even greater in Robinette.
317. Id. at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 286.
319. Note, however, that the majority does state that the meaning of voluntariness "cannot be taken literally
to mean a 'knowing' choice." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224. However, this statement refers to knowledge of a right
to refuse consent as being indeterminative in confession cases. Id. at 223-27. The Court does not speak of the
knowledge requirement as a separate element for finding valid consent. In fact, it skips past that issue by simply
stating "[slimilar considerations lead us to [believe]" that voluntariness is the proper test to apply for consent to
search. Id. at 227. This statement is the Court's only attempt to relate the due process confession cases to the
consent to search issue.
320. For recent criticisms of Schneckloth, see Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte:
Incorporating Obedience Theory Into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntay Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
215,215, that analyzes "the Supreme Court's conception of voluntariness in light of modern psychological findings
on authority and obedience." See generally Rebecca A. Stack, Note, Airport Drug Searches: Giving Content to the
Concept of Free and Voluntary Consent, 77 VA. L. REv. 183, 202-05 (1991) (arguing that all consent searches
should be based upon some level of suspicion prior to the police officer's requesting consent). The author also
argues, contrary to Schneckloth, that a suspect should have knowledge of her right to refuse consent for a court to
find that the consent was given voluntarily. Id. at 205-08. For additional criticisms of the Schneckloth analysis, see
3 LAFAVE, supra note 61, at § 8.1(a)(I-5) (discussing various commentators' criticisms of this opinion).
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a. Just as in Schneckloth, the Voluntariness Standard Fails to Provide
Adequate Protection
Voluntariness as a standard for determining whether a subject has waived his
Fourth Amendment rights does not adequately protect citizens from invasions by
police officers. Since Schneckloth was decided, and indeed before it was decided,
courts have readily interpreted "voluntary" to mean "not coerced.""32 Although the
government is supposed to have the burden of proving that consent was given
voluntarily,322 in practice it need only point to the fact that the subject responded
affirmatively to the officer's request for consent.323 Absent an unlawful claim of
authority to search,324 or some physically coercive conduct by the police,325 a
defendant who answers "yes" to a request to search by the police is almost surely
to be found to have voluntarily consented.326
Under the facts of Robinette, it is clear that the "voluntariness" standard did
nothing to protect Robinette's Fourth Amendment rights. Officer Newsome said
"[o]ne question before you get gone '327 to Robinette prior to requesting consent to
search. 28 A person in Robinette's position could have reasonably concluded that the
answering of the questions was a condition which he had to meet prior to Officer
321. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (stating that in determining whether consent was voluntary, "itisonly
by analyzing all the circumstances of an individual consent that it can be ascertained whether in fact it was...
coerced"); see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543,550 (1968) (indicating that "[w]here there is coercion
there cannot be [valid] consent"). This last quote says simply that coerced consent is not voluntary; it does not say
that coercion is all that is relevant.
322. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248 (holding that the state must prove that consent was in fact voluntarily
given, and not the result of coercion). See generally 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 83 (1993) (stating that
the burden of proving voluntariness of consent is on the government).
323. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 284 (Marshall, L. dissenting) ("Thus, all the police must do is conduct what
will inevitably be a charade of asking for consent. If they display any firmness at all, a verbal expression of assent
will undoubtedly be forthcoming.").
324. See, e.g., Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550 (involving a situation where police gained consent to enter a person's
house using an unlawful claim of authority to search).
325. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures §§ 83-91 (1993 & Supp. 1997) (noting several police-citizen
encounters and the differing ways in which courts handle the issue of coercion for purposes of determining the
validity of consent to search); see also id. at 711 (indicating that, in one case, consent was not found to be valid
where it was sought after three hours of continuous interrogation and after the district attorney told the subject that
he could probably get a search warrant anyway) (citing Commonwealth v. Mamon, 297 A.2d 471, 475 (Penn.
1972); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that it is rare for a court to find consent
given at gunpoint to be voluntary). But see, e.g., United States v. Puglisi, 790 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding
that consent was validly obtained from an arrestee even though he was arrested with weapons drawn, he was in
handcuffs, and he had been frisked).
326. See Barrio, supra note 320, at 217 (asserting that "[u]nder Schneckloth as modified by subsequent cases,
only a showing of affirmative police misconduct can invalidate a suspect's consent") (citations omitted).
327. Robinette 111, 519 U.S. at 35.
328. Id. at 36.
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Newsome's letting him go.3 29 Further, a reasonable person could have felt that the
answer must be one Officer Newsome would expect before Robinette would be free
to go.330 Thus, the conditioning of Robinette's freedom to leave upon his giving an
affirmative answer to Officer Newsome's request for consent, alone, likely made
the subsequent consent involuntary.
Other factors tended to increase the coercive nature of the encounter. Officer
Newsome requested Robinette to exit the vehicle, thus taking away any protective
environment that Robinette would have felt from being in the vehicle. 3 t He turned
on his car-mounted camera in order to video tape the entire encounter.33 2 This alone
would increase the coercive nature of the encounter by putting everything Robinette
said and did on video and audio tape. Probably the most significant factor, however,
was the fact that Officer Newsome did not ticket Robinette, but rather gave him a
warning.333 Most people who were just "let off" like Robinette would likely respond
in a favorable manner to a police officer's request to search, especially because they
would likely believe that the officer could always convert that "warning" into a
ticket if they did not act in a helpful manner.
All of these factors tended to increase the coercive nature of the encounter, but
under the standard as applied by the United States Supreme Court, this level of
coercion was not enough to find that Robinette was unlawfully seized or that he was
coerced into giving his consent to search. 3  In the absence of some physical threat
of force or other physically aggressive conduct, there are few factual situations
under which the Court would find that a reasonable person in the detainee's position
329. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[sleveral circumstances support the Ohio courts'
conclusion that a reasonable motorist in [Robinette's] shoes would have believed that he had an obligation to
answer the 'one question' and that he could not simply walk away from the officer"). Justice Stevens also pointed
to the fact that the question itself sought an answer "before you get gone." Id.
330. See Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 669, 701 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Under many circumstances a
reasonable person might read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of
law."); see also infra note 333 (noting that Officer Newsome could have changed Robinette's warning to a ticket
if he felt Robinette gave him a flippant response); rev'd 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
331. In Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 38, the Court noted that Mimms, 434 U.S. at "111 n.6, justified Newsome
in commanding Robinette from the vehicle, yet the Court did not discuss whether such ajustified seizure could have
still increased the coerciveness of the encounter later in time. Simply because an act of seizing someone may be
justified does not nullify the coercive nature of the act.
332. The facts of Robinette do not indicate whether Robinette knew that Officer Newsome turned on the
video camera. Officer Newsome did request Robinette to exit his vehicle and have him stand in front of the patrol
car prior to turning on the video camera. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697. Thus, Robinette might have seen the
officer activate the camera. The Ohio Supreme Court considered the fact that the video camera was on as a coercive
factor. Id.
333. See, e.g., Official Transcript at *7-9, Robinette IlI, 519 U.S. 33 (No. 95-891) (acknowledging that
Officer Newsome had the power to void out the written warning and issue a ticket instead, and that he had the
discretion as an officer to void the warning and give a ticket if Robinette gave him a flippant response).
334. Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
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might not feel free to leave or might not have consented but for coercion by the
police.335
b. The Advising of the Right to Refuse Consent was Plainly Practical
Here
The second argument articulated by the Schneckloth Court, that advising the
subject that he has a right to refuse consent to search would be "thoroughly
impractical, ' 336 is clearly inappropriate under the facts in Robinette and Retherford.
Recall that in Retherford, Officer Newsome testified that he usually would tell
subjects that they were free to go prior to applying his technique for gaining consent
to search.337 Although that particular warning applied to the issue of the subject's
freedom of movement, and thus the seizure issue, it displayed clearly how the
police can naturally and effectively interject a warning of the subject's rights during
a lawful seizure.338
Thus, the claim by the Supreme Court that the warning of rights would have
some detrimental effect on the police-citizen encounter is not supported by Officer
Newsome's experience. Note that in Robinette, Officer Newsome did not give the
warning to the defendant that he was free to go. However, since Officer Newsome
was present in both Retherford and Robinette, and because he was using
substantially the same technique to gain consent to search in both cases, Retherford
impliedly shows that had Newsome given Robinette the warning that he was free
to go, it would not have substantially affected his ability to gain Robinette' s consent
to search. This is contrary to the argument made in Schneckloth that was not based
on any facts.
3 39
Additional evidence demonstrates that the Court's reliance on Schneckloth is
incorrect. For years, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has routinely warned a
subject of her right to refuse consent prior to requesting consent to search.340 Law
enforcement training programs recommend issuing such a warning as well. 34'
335. See Barrio, supra note 320, at 218 (arguing that "Schneckloth misapprehended the potential for
psychological coercion in the context of consent searches"). For examples of extreme situations where courts have
found valid consent, see generally 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures §§ 83-91 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
336. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231 ("[Ilt would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent
search the detailed requirements of an effective warning.").
337. State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
338. See id. (discussing OfficerNewsome's technique forgaining consent to search, and the successful results
of that technique).
339. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-33 (discussing why giving a detainee a warning that he has a right to
refuse consent would unnecessarily impact the overall encounter).
340. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
341. See, e.g., Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 52-53 n.12 (Stevens. J., dissenting) (noting, from the amicus brief
filed by Americans For Effective Law Enforcement (AFELE), that many law enforcement agencies have included
the Robinette seizure warning to their consent to search forms); id. (arguing further that such a warning is
recommended in many police training programs, and that the AFELE training program speakers give the
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Warning the suspect of her constitutional right simply will not substantially affect
law enforcement. If given a warning, however, a suspect would be able to make an
informed choice because she would know of alternative courses of action.
c. The Ease of Giving a Warning of the Right to Refuse Consent Makes
the Zerbst Argument Unpersuasive
The final significantjustification this Comment discusses is that the application
of the Zerbst waiver standard is inappropriate because Schneckloth did not involve
a Sixth Amendment right to counsel context.142 The Schneckloth Court argued that
such a standard would create an insurmountable burden on the police in determining
whether consent was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. As
discussed earlier, these arguments must both fail, and not because they are
necessarily wrong.3 " They must fail because a lesser standard of proof could be
used, that of informing a suspect of her right to refuse consent, and it could
adequately protect the right of the defendant from involuntarily waiving her Fourth
Amendment protections.
By analogizing Robinette and Schneckloth, one can see that giving a warning
to subjects that they are free to leave would not significantly affect the ability of
police to engage in consensual conversations subsequent to lawful traffic stops. This
fact is evident in practice.345 Such a warning would, however, ensure that subjects
know that they have two options when an officer attempts to engage them in such
a conversation: They can either assert their right to go, as per the officer's warning,
or they can voluntarily choose to remain and answer the officer's questions.3 46 This
type of protection would likely satisfy the demands of the most ardent supporters
of Fourth Amendment protections and individual liberties.347
recommendation for such a warning).
342. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235.
343. Id. at 245.
344. See supra Part IV.A.1.d (discussing, in part, the portion of the Schneckloth analysis regarding whether
to adopt a Zerbst standard for waiver under consent to search doctrine, and the inherent problems with the reasoning
the Court used to reach its result on this issue).
345. The number of consent searches that Officer Newsome engaged in indicates that he did not have much
difficulty gaining consent to search after warning suspects that they were free to leave. See supra note 97
(delineating Newsome's technique for gaining consent to search and the effectiveness of that technique).
346. This assumes that the officer refrains from conduct which would indicate to a reasonable person that,
despite the warning, she was not free to go or free to withhold consent. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435
(1991) (stating that when officers have no basis for approaching a person, they may still approach and ask questions
of that person so long as they do not indicate to that person that compliance with their requests is required).
347. Cf. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at277 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that he could not believe that a person
could waive a constitutional right that he was not made aware of); id. at 284-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing
for a standard that would require an officer to either inform the subject of the right to refuse consent, or forcing the
State to prove that the subject had such knowledge when he consented to a search).
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Therefore, by applying the principle of particular justification,"8 realizing the
inherent problems with the Schneckloth reasoning, and noting that none of the
Schneckloth justifications really apply under the facts of Robinette, it follows that
the Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test was inappropriately applied to the
decision in Robinette. The Court should have reconsidered the Schneckloth test
instead of summarily applying it in Robinette.
B. Viewing Robinette as a Case about Seizures of Persons
Because the bright line rule announced by the Ohio Supreme Court referred to
the need to warn a subject of his right to go prior to engaging him in consensual
interrogation, 349 and did not expressly focus on the issue of whether he had a right
to refuse consent, it would seem that Robinette really considered the issue of
whether or not Robinette was unlawfully seized when he gave his consent to search.
Thus, this Comment continues by discussing the facts of Robinette as it falls within
the realm of Fourth Amendment seizure law. It also discusses the prudence of the
Supreme Court's finding that the bright line warning is both detrimental to law
enforcement, and that it is unnecessary under the totality of the circumstances test.
1. Robinette and its Bright Line Rule With Regard to Seizures
Recall that the bright line rule announced by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Robinette 11350 required officers to advise a person that she is free to leave if the
person was validly stopped pursuant to a traffic stop, and the purpose of the original
seizure had ceased, but the officer wanted to ask further investigative questions,
including consent to search."' As this Comment argued earlier, the Robinette H
rule regards seizures of persons and not consent to search.35 2 The question of the
legality of the search, in the absence of such a warning, would be dependent upon
whether the illegal seizure tainted the subsequent consent to search. 3
Assuming, however, that the United States Supreme Court correctly
acknowledged this fact, the validity of a bright line rule can be discussed in terms
of seizure law. In Robinette III, the Court asserted that giving a warning to a
detainee that he was free to go was not required by the Fourth Amendment. 354 In
support of this contention, the Court stated that it has "consistently eschewed
348. See supra Part .B (discussing the principle of particular justification).
349. Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
350. 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995).
351. Id. at 699.
352. See supra Part IV (concluding that Robinette is concerned with seizures of persons, and not consent to
search).
353. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
354. See Robinette 11, 519 U.S. at 40 (rejecting the bright line rule adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 696).
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bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry." '355 The problem with this assertion is that it is patently false.
Although the Court has, in certain circumstances, eschewed bright line rules,
356
there are many instances where it adopted bright line rules in a Fourth Amendment
context. For example, in New York v. Belton,57 the Court adopted a bright line rule
regarding search incident to a lawful arrest of an occupant of an automobile. 358 The
Court based its new rule on the justifications that courts have had difficulty
applying the Chimel doctrine 359 in the context of arrests of occupants of vehicles,
and the need to guide police in making quick, on the spot, decisions. 36 In United
States v. Robinson,36t the Court created a bright line rule allowing officers, incident
to a lawful traffic arrest, to search the person of the arrestee, regardless of whether
they believe the person has dangerous weapons. 362 The Court further declared that
the officer in Robinson was allowed to open a cigarette container found during the
search, even though he did not fear that the arrestee was armed.363 As with Belton,
the Robinson Court felt it necessary to aid police during the arrest of a person by
giving them a bright line rule to guide their conduct.
364
In California v. Hodari D.,365 the Court adopted what is arguably a bright line
rule regarding show-of-authority seizures during police pursuits. The Court declared
that a seizure in this context was not to be determined by the Mendenhall rule
alone, but rather would be determined by considering whether the police officer
355. Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 39.
356. In Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 39, the Court gives several examples of its refusal to adopt bright line rules.
In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). the Court refused to find that questioning of persons on buses for the
purpose of drug interdiction was a seizure per se. Id. at 439. In Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. the Court argued against
a bright line rule requiring officers to give a person the advice that she is free to refuse consent prior to requesting
consent to search.
357. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
358. Id. at 462-63 (declaring that the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein are always
within the immediate grabbing area of the arrestee and thus subject to search).
359. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (holding that the police may search the person of
an arrestee and the area within her immediate grabbing area as incident to a lawful arrest).
360. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 ("[A]s one commentator has pointed out, the protections of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments 'can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which ... makes it possible
to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified."') (quoting LaFave.
"Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardiced Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma." 1971 SUP. CT. REV.
127, 142); see also id.(stating that "[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers") (quoting
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
361. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
362. Id. at 235. Assuming that the arrest was based on probable cause, the subsequent search incident to the
arrest requires no further justification. Id.
363. Id. at 236.
364. See id. at 235 ("A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect
whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment, which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be
broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.").
365. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
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either physically touched the fleeing person or the person submitted to the officer's
authority.366 This is arguably a bright line rule because it requires only a
determination of whether the suspect discontinued his fleeing, or whether the
officer touched the suspect, to ascertain whether the suspect was seized under the
Fourth Amendment.
Finally, in Pennsylvania v. Minims367 and Maryland v. Wilson,361 the Court
adopted bright line rules regarding the ability of police officers to request the driver
and passengers to exit their vehicle during a lawful traffic stop.369 The justification
for both rules centered around the need for protecting officers' safety during traffic
stops, 370 balanced against the de minimus further invasion upon the already seized
drivers and passengers. 37' The need to protect officer safety trumped the
incrementally increased invasion upon the drivers and passengers, and thus it was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to give the officer the discretion to order
such persons out of the vehicle if the'need arose.
372
These cases show that the Supreme Court was being disingenuous when it stated
that it has consistently eschewed bright line rules. In fact, the Court has adopted
several bright line rules, especially where the adoption of such a rule would either
aid police in making on the spot decisions, -or where lower courts have had
difficulty applying a particular rule. Thus, this justification from Robinette was
patently false. The Court has readily adopted bright lines when it has reasoned that
creating such rules would be prudent in light of the relative balance between
governmental concerns and citizens' privacy interests.
2. Reasons Why a Bright Line Rule is Preferable Here
a. The Giving of the Warning is Practical
Just as with the consent to search context, warning detainees that they are free
to leave is completely practical and even recommended by some law enforcement
authorities. Officer Newsome's conduct and testimony from Robinette373 and
Retherford3 74 evidence this. His technique included telling the persons that they
366. Id. at 629.
367. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
368. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
369. Minms, 434 U.S. at I I n.6: Wilson. 117 S. Ct. at 886.
370. See Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885-86 (noting statistical data showing the safety risks of officers making traffic
stops); Minms, 434 U.S. at 110 (relying also on statistical data showing the safety risks of officers during traffic
stops).
371. See Wilson. 117 S. Ct. at 886 (stating that, "[w]hile there is not the same basis for ordering the passengers
out of the car as there is for the driver out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal"): see also Minms,
434 U.S. at I I l (balancing the need for officer safety against the driver's privacy interests).
372. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886; Minns, 434 U.S. at Il1 n.6.
373. Robinette 1I, 519 U.S. at 48 (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
374. See State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (describing Officer Newsome's
technique for gaining consent to search).
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were free to go.375 Again, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in gaining consent
to search, made it a policy to warn persons of their right to refuse consent. 76 Law
enforcement training schools and seminars promote the use of such a warning.
377
Thus, the argument that giving a warning would have a significantly adverse affect
on the ability of the police to gain consent to search, or in this context, to further
detain a person consensually, has proven to be unwarranted as applied. Police
enforcement agencies would not be likely to employ a technique which they knew
was not required, if they knew that it would have a substantial impact on their
ability to engage in consensual encounters.378
b. The Giving of the Warning is Particularly Necessary in This Context
The requirement of giving a warning to the detainees that they are free to go
prior to requesting consent to search is even more necessary under the Robinette
facts than it would be under a "true" consensual encounter between a police officer
and a citizen. Under the "true" consensual encounter, the police officer may
approach a person for any number of reasons, 379 but in most respects the citizen will
probably not, upon first approach, feel restrained from leaving.380 Under the
Robinette facts, however, the situation is completely different, because the subject
was originally seized for some lawful purpose.38 ' The problem arises when the
purpose of the initial seizure has ended and the police officer wishes to engage the
suspect in "consensual conversation."
As the Ohio Supreme Court noted, the transition from the lawful seizure to the
consensual encounter can be seamless.382 Applying a standard where a defendant
is seized a second time only if she meets the Mendenhall test gives the defendant
little protection; she likely feels "seized" until the entire encounter is complete,3 83
375. Id.
376. Although this is not a warning of a right to leave, it is similar in that it shows the practicality of giving
a warning of rights without affecting the outcome of the police-citizen interaction.
377. Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 52-53 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
378. Note that the police might decide that giving the warning is helpful, because it virtually ensures that a
court will find that no seizure occurred. This assumes, however, that these agencies will balance the benefit of
facilitating consensual encounters against the burden of lost consensual encounters which do not develop due to
the warning.
379. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (stating that "not all personal intercourse between
policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons").
380. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (noting that "[Mendenhall] was not
seized simply by... the fact that the agents approached her," asked for her identification and ticket, and asked her
a few questions).
381. See Robinette II1, 519 U.S. at 35 (stating that Robinette was stopped for speeding).
382. Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
383. See id. ("Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the officer
continues to interrogate them .... [A] reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues
to address him."); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) (acknowledging that "few motorists
would feel free either to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without being told
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and she is likely unable to determine whether or not the initial lawful seizure is
completed. 84 Without some sort of indication to the suspects that they are free to
leave, there is little to support the argument that, on their own volition, the subjects
will feel confident enough in themselves and their knowledge of the law to assert
their right to leave.385
Additionally, one must consider the police officer's conduct during the
purported "consensual encounter." In Robinette, Officer Newsome preceded the
"consensual conversation" with the preface, "one question before you get gone., 38
6
This language alone implies to drivers that they are not free to go until they answer
"one more question." The officer only gave Robinette a warning, thus retaining an
upper-hand in his further dealings with Robinette; a person would not want to act
adversely to the officer's request for fear that the previous "gift" of a warning may
be rescinded and replaced with a speeding ticket.8 7 Cumulating the officer's
conduct with the natural restraining effect which exists throughout the duration of
a traffic stop, it is unlikely that Robinette felt free to leave when Newsome
requested consent. Thus, compared to a true consensual encounter, the
characteristics of a Robinette-type encounter are drastically different; as such the
two situations should not be treated as equivalent.
C. Conclusion of Robinette III Analysis
The principle of particular justification 388 necessitates several results from the
preceding discussion. First, the Court incorrectly applied cases to the Robinette
facts, which could -be justified neither internally nor in light of Robinette.
Schneckloth's arguments fail to support its result, especially its conclusion
regarding the inapplicability of its argued-for, but unadopted bright line rule. The
facts of Robinette make the condition created by Schneckloth even more acute.
Thus, the Court in Robinette improvidently applied the Schneckloth reasoning to the
facts at hand.
Second, the Court incorrectly argued that it has consistently eschewed bright
line rules, when in fact it has readily adopted such rules for Fourth Amendment
they might do so").
384. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 699.
385. See Maclin, supra note 241, at 794 (concluding that the Schneckloth Court's analysis ignored "the reality
of a typical police confrontation. A police confrontation is unlike a 'friendly chat' between two neighbors."). Maclin
continues by arguing that most cases of consensual search are the result of acquiescence to an implied claim of
lawful authority to search by the police. Id. (citation omitted).
386. Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 35.
387. See Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 771 (noting that the state conceded "that an officer has discretion to
issue a ticket rather than a warning to a motorist if the motorist becomes uncooperative"); see also Barrio, supra
note 320, at 241-42 (arguing that police represent legitimate authority, and because of the "visual trappings" of their
authority, the legitimacy of the authority tends to be increased; it also tends to show that noncompliance with that
authority may be "swiftly punished").
388. See supra Part I.B (discussing this principle).
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purposes. The Court also improperly argued that warning persons that they are free
to go would be unrealistic. Officer Newsome's conduct, and the practices of various
law enforcement agencies and schools, confirm the fact that the giving of such a
warning is not only practical, but is also recommended. Additionally, the scenario
that Robinette faced was clearly distinguishable from the typical police-citizen
consensual encounter. Because of the inherent problems the citizen faces with
determining whether she is free to leave after being stopped for a traffic violation,
it is virtually impossible to expect her to ever feel free to leave until the officer
informs her of that right.
Finally further review of case law and practical experience show that the
adoption of a bright line rule requiring officers to inform citizens of their right to
leave would be advantageous to citizens, police, and the courts. Citizens would feel
safer knowing that police are not using the citizens' ignorance of the law against
them in this context. Police would know to give the appropriate warning under
specified circumstances; this is a warning that many officers give already, thus
reducing the cumulative change in police procedures. Finally, courts would have a
bright line rule to apply to these encounters-one which would create a condition
precedent to the finding of voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances. 89
V. ROBINETTE IV: EVIDENCE OF THE CONFUSION CREATED BY CURRENT CONSENT
TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
As stated earlier, the Ohio Supreme Court recently reconsidered Robinette,39
0
but this time it adopted a different approach-one which may actually decrease the
protections for citizens of Ohio in traffic stop situations. This Comment will briefly
critique the Ohio Supreme Court's analyses of the seizure and consent to search
issues, and then it will discuss the new problems that the Ohio Supreme Court
created when it decided to harmonize its state law with the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. Then the Comment will
conclude by offering a solution to the problems which Robinette III and IV created.
A. Criticism of the Robinette IV Seizure Discussion
The first significant problem with the Ohio Supreme Court's seizure discussion
concerns the court's rule from syllabus one.39' Focusing on Newsome's questioning
389. See supra notes 340-41 and accompanying text (explaining that the habitual use of such a warning is
feasible and desirable).
390. Robinetie IV, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997).
391. Syllabus one states:
When a police officer's objective justification to continue detention of a person stopped for a traffic
violation for the purpose of searching the person's vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original
stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion
of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention to conduct a
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for contraband alone, the Court found the extended detention valid utilizing the test
espoused in dicta from Brown v. Texas 392 and Florida v. Royer.393 The problem with
this argument is twofold. First, the Brown test, as applied in a sobriety checkpoint3 94
and border patrol contexts,3 95 allows suspicionless seizures,3 96 whereas the Royer
facts deal with the issue of whether a seizure occurred at all.397 Thus, the cases
which the court used to adopt its rule for syllabus one were internally inconsistent.
Moreover, even if one assumes that the Brown test could apply to these
circumstances, 398 the court failed to apply its rule correctly. The rule states that if
the justification for the continued detention is not related to the purpose for the
initial stop, and the justification is not based on some degree of suspicion of illegal
activity, then the seizure is unlawful. 399 Here the objective justification for the
continued detention was drug interdiction, and the purpose of the original stop was
search constitutes an illegal seizure.
Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
392. 443 U.S. 47 (1979); see id. at 50-51 (stating that, when considering the constitutionality of a seizure
which does not rise to the level of a traditional arrest, the Court should weigh the gravity of the public interests
involved, the degree to which the seizure promotes that interest, and the severity of the interference upon the
individual's liberty).
393. 460 U.S. 491 (1983); see id. at 500 (asserting that the reasonableness of police conduct based on less
than probable cause may be supported by a legitimate law enforcement interest, so long as the scope of the police
conduct is carefully tailored to its justification); see also Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 767-68 (utilizing this language
from Brown and Royer).
394. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990) (holding that "the balance of the
State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance
that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of
[allowing sobriety checkpoints]").
395. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,566 (1976) (holding that "stops for brief questioning
routinely conducted at permanent [border] checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and need not be
authorized by warrant"). In Prouse, the Court proceeded to limit its holding to the types of stops described in that
particular case. Id. at 567.
396. See id. at 562 (stating that "the stops and questioning [in border patrol cases] may be made in the
absence of any individualized suspicion at reasonably located [permanent] checkpoints"). Thus, no suspicion is
required to effect the stop. Id. The Court also noted that "[ilt is agreed that checkpoint stops are 'seizures' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 556; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450,455 (noting that stops at sobriety
check-points are seizures, yet are reasonable underthe Fourth Amendment despite the absence of suspicion of illicit
activity).
397. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 501-02 (determining if and when Royer was seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment).
398. Arguably, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979),
makes this assumption false. There, the Court declared unconstitutional Delaware's policy of randomly stopping
drivers to determine whether they had valid drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations. Id. at 659. The Court further
stated that "[t]his kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in
previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent."
Id. at 661 (citations omitted). Thus, since Officer Newsome had the complete discretion in Robinette to ask or not
ask any particular driver the questions regarding contraband, such questioning likely cannot be supported on the
basis of a suspicionless seizure because may violate Prouse.
399. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 763.
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Robinette's speeding. 4°° Thus, the purposes of the initial stop and continued
detention were not related. Additionally, there was no suspicion of illegal activity
that would justify further detention.0 Consequently, the continued detention, even
to ask the questions regarding whether Robinette was carrying drugs, was
unlawful.
402
The court could have plausibly argued that the rule in syllabus one only applies
when the continued detention is for the purpose of conducting a search, 4 3 and that
since the continued contraband questioning was merely done to find out if Robinette
had drugs, and not for search purposes, the rule does not require both elements. In
other words, if the continued detention is not for the purpose of gaining consent to
search, then the rule does not apply. This argument, however, is inconsistent with
Newsome's own testimony, which showed that his entire questioning process,
starting with the interrogation regarding contraband and culminating in the consent
to search request, was one designed to obtain consent to search.4° Thus, based upon
the specific facts of Robinette, the court could not have properly applied its rule
here.
Even if the rule was applied correctly, expecting police officers, citizens and
courts to apply it is unreasonable. These groups have had difficulty in correctly
applying a totality of the circumstances test to scenarios where there was a
continued detention that turned into a consensual encounter.40 5 The Ohio Supreme
Court incorrectly created a third justification for a continued detention, that of a
suspicionless seizure, with which citizens, police, and courts must deal with. As the
law currently stands, there can be a detention based on probable cause or reasonable
suspicion that subsequently becomes a suspicionless seizure, and which can then
transform into a consensual encounter.
If the Ohio Supreme Court was truly worried about the seamless way in which
valid seizures could become consensual encounters, and the difficulty for the
citizens to determine whether they are seized under such circumstances, 4 6 it would
400. See id. at 768 (stating that the justification for the further detention "promotes the public interest in
quelling the drug trade"); id. at 767 (noting that Newsome's justification for stopping Robinette was speeding).
401. See Robinette 11, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1995) (noting that Newsome extended Robinette's
detention based on "no reason related to the speeding violation, and based on no articulable facts").
402. Cf. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 768 (finding that Newsome was justified in detaining Robinette to ask
him the question about drugs, but not justified in detaining him to request consent to search).
403. The rule states in part: "[The continued detention to conduct a search ... " Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d
at 767 (emphasis added).
404. See Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698 (stating that Newsome utilized his technique in order to imply to
Robinette that he must answer the officer's questions, which would include the request to search); see also State
v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d498,501 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (noting Officer Newsome's technique for gaining consent
to search, which involved the same conduct which Newsome utilized in Robinette). These two cases indicate that
Newsome's goal in both was to extend the detention of both persons in order to ultimately gain consent to search,
405. One need not look far for evidence of this. In Robinette IV, the Court noted that even the Ohio Attorney
General missed the transition between the lawful seizure, the consensual encounter, and the unlawful seizure.
Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 771 n.5.
406. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698.
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not have adopted this third category of police-citizen encounters. By allowing a
suspicionless seizure to occur between the end of a justifiable traffic stop and the
beginning of a "consensual encounter," the court actually increased the level of
knowledge that subjects must have in order to determine their "seizure" status.
Citizens in Ohio will now need to distinguish between suspicionless seizures
and consensual encounters, even if both are preceded by a lawful seizure. 7
Common sense and experience would indicate that few people will be able to
correctly determine their seizure status in the context of a traffic stop given the
existence of the coercive nature of the encounter and the three possible
classifications of their seizure status during the encounter.40 8
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court's new seizure rule, which it attempted to
fashion from federal case law, simply cannot be supported. The court itself
developed the rule based on two cases which are analytically distinguishable, and
which discuss two very different issues.4 9 Further, the court itself misapplied the
rule to the facts of Robinette. If the court cannot apply its own rule correctly, how
can it expect the average citizen stopped for a traffic violation to correctly apply it?
Finally, the court created a hair-line distinction between two types of justified
seizures and a consensual encounter, a distinction that even the most learned Ohio
citizens will have much difficulty applying.
B. Criticism of the Robinette IV Consent to Search Discussion
The first problem with the consent to search analysis was that the court adopted
a Schneckloth standard for determining validity of consent to search, yet it relied
solely on the arguments made by the Schneckloth Court.410 As this Comment has
argued previously, Schneckloth is analytically unjustified, and to that extent it
should not be summarily applied without reconsideration of its justifications.4 tt
In its discussion of whether the consent by Robinette was given independently
of the invalid seizure, the court acknowledged the issue that the United States
Supreme Court missed-the bright line rule espoused in Robinette II was one
regarding seizure. It merely made knowledge of a right to leave the sine qua non of
a valid consensual encounter subsequent to a lawful seizure,4t 2 and it said nothing
about whether the consent to search was invalid. To determine the answer to that
question, the Ohio Supreme Court applied an attenuation analysis to see if the
407. This is, of course, assumes that Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), does not invalidate this part
of Robinette IV.
408. See supra note 405 (noting the State's difficulty in making this distinction).
409. See supra notes 394-96 and accompanying text (discussing the analytical differences between the two
cases).
410. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 769.
411. See generally supra Part IV.A.I (criticizing the Schneckloth justifications).
412. See Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 698-99 (discussing the need for a bright line, and the substance of the
warning).
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consent to search was tainted by the unlawful seizure.4" 3 Thus, this further
demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court "missed the boat" when it held
that the Ohio Supreme Court's bright line rule was inconsistent with Schneckloth .
41
Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court's rule in syllabus three is a misstatement of
federal law.415 It says that for the state to prove that consent to search was
independent of an unlawful seizure, it must show that, under the circumstances, a
reasonable person would have felt free to refuse to answer and could in fact leave. 416
The error in this statement is simply that the issue of whether the suspect can in fact
leave is only relevant to the extent that the officer conveyed that message to him.
417
Thus, the court erroneously adopted an "in fact" rule regarding consent to search
subsequent to an unlawful detention, making its rule disharmonious with federal
law.
VI. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE
A. The Road Not Traveled
Perhaps the best statement of the Robinette dilemma was made by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Robinette II:
We are aware that consensual encounters between police and citizens are
an important... investigative tool. However citizens who have not been
detained immediately prior to being encountered and questioned by police
are more apt to realize that they need not respond to a police officer's
questions. A "consensual encounter" immediately following a detention is
likely to be imbued with the authoritative aura of the detention. Without a
clear break from the detention, the succeeding encounter is not consensual
at all.
418
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Robinette II, accurately identified the problem. Not
all "consensual encounters" should be treated the same; those which follow a lawful
seizure are inherently coercive. Even where a citizen believes a police encounter is
over, he will not likely feel free to go until the officer informs him that he may do
413. Id. at 698.
414. See Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 40 (stating that totality of the circumstances is the proper test for
determining voluntariness of consent to search, and that "[t]he Supreme Court ofOhio having held otherwise....
is reversed").
415. For the text of syllabus three, see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
416. Robinette IV, 685 N.E.2d at 763 (citations omitted).
417. See, e.g.. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554 n.6 (1980) (acknowledging that the subjective
intention of the officer to detain Mendenhall was irrelevant, unless it was conveyed to the defendant). The key
question was whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Id. at 554.
418. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 699 (citations omitted).
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so. 4 '9 A bright line rule requiring an officer to inform a detainee that he is free to go
breaks that tension. This gives the person a clear indication that the encounter is
over, thereby giving him confidence in knowing that he will not be doing anything
wrong if he leaves. Thus, the bright line rule is necessary, in most instances, to tell
detainees when the encounter is over, therefore giving them a reason to feel free to
leave in a Mendenhall seizure sense.
Further, such a rule would apply only to cases where a person is seized pursuant
to some lawful reason and when the officer wants to continue questioning the
person after the reason for the initial stop no longer exists. Hence, the number of
cases where the bright line rule would apply would be limited.
The rule would also be easy to apply. Officers likely know when they have
seized a person, especially in a traffic stop situation. Further, they will know, based
on experience, when a person will likely feel free to leave (that is, the seizure no
longer exists). The officer could always "hedge his bets" and give the warning if he
is unsure if the detainee feels free to leave. The rule may also prevent conduct like
that of Officer Newsome-conduct designed to use the detainee's lack of
knowledge of the law to unjustifiably increase the scope of a traffic stop. 20
The rule would not abrogate the totality of the circumstances test. Such a test
would still be necessary because every situation is different. An officer's
notification to a suspect that the suspect is free to go, followed by conduct
indicating to a reasonable person that he is not actually free to go may still
constitute a seizure. This assumes the person either submitted to lawful authority
or was physically touched by the officer.4 2 The rule would, however, recognize that
few people, if any, feel free to leave after being seized by police unless the officer
tells them that they are free to leave. As such, the warning is imperative in these
limited circumstances.
Finally, the key significance of the rule would be to ensure that, in the absence
of such a warning, the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable police
conduct will be triggered. Could an officer still be able to lawfully detain a person
without giving the warning? The answer is yes, assuming that the officer has
specific, articulable facts within his knowledge which would reasonably lead him
to believe that crime is afoot.
422
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Robinette II did not conclude that Officer
Newsome could not engage in such conduct. Rather, it stated that if Newsome was
going to use his technique for gaining consent to search, he must either give the
419. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 466 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (noting that an individual stopped for a traffic
violation likely would not feel free to leave until told to do so); see also Robinette I1, 653 N.E.2d at 698 (discussing
the improbability that people feel free to leave as long as an officer continues to interrogate them).
420. Robinette II, 653 N.E.2d at 697-98.
421. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,626-27 (1991).
422. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 30 (1968) (requiring an officer to have reasonable, articulable suspicion
that crime is afoot prior to seizing a person).
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seizure warning-in which case there is a good chance that the "detainee" will be
found to have not been seized-or he may choose not to give the warning, so long
as he has reasonable suspicion to justify the further seizure."
B. Finale
In Robinette III, the United States Supreme Court had an excellent opportunity
to reconsider its law regarding consensual seizures and the validity of consent to
search. Instead of seizing this opportunity, the Court propagated its case law
unquestioningly. Without justification, it struck down the bright line seizure rule
adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court.424 Without a logical basis, it supported the
Schneckloth rule despite a plethora of literature indicating that Schneckloth was
poorly decided.
As the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrated in Robinette II, the bright line rule
would have been preferable. The rule would not have abrogated the totality of the
circumstances test, but rather would have made knowledge of the right to leave a
condition precedent to finding a valid seizure.42 It would not have affected the
Schneckloth rule because of the state court's use of the attenuation doctrine. The
bright line rule would simply have clarified the law for citizens, police, and the
courts.
Now Ohio's seizure and consent to search case law is extremely muddied with
seamless distinctions which are sanctioned, without justification, by the United
States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court. Fortunately, evidence shows
that many law enforcement agencies promote the use of warnings of the rights to
leave or to refuse consent prior to further detention or requests for consent to
search.426 Yet this approach is questionable.
It is difficult to believe that the Framers intended that the police be the primary
protectors of our constitutional freedoms. In the constitutional framework, the Court
has the affirmative obligation to protect minority rights. The Court has decided to
ignore its duty as protector of our constitutional guarantees and has instead decided
to give the police the ability to determine the extent and scope of those protections.
The citizens of the United States, at the very least, deserve a principled reason for
such a result.
423. Id.
424. See supra Part IV.A.2 (emphasizing the lack of justification for applying Schneckloth to the facts of
Robinette); see also Robinette III, 519 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J.. dissenting) (concluding that the Robinette II bright
line rule was not even applied in Robinette's case, but rather was intended to guide the decisions of future cases).
425. See supra note 389 and accompanying text (discussing this rule).
426. See supra notes 299-301, 305 (emphasizing the fact that police agencies promote the use of such
warnings).
